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Abstract
Lifetime financial-, work- and health-related decisions made by agents are in-
tertwined with one another, thereby requiring joint modeling. This methodological
paper numerically solves, simulates, and structurally estimates a dynamic life cycle
model of allocations (consumption/savings, leisure/work and health expenditures),
statuses (health, financial and pension wealth) and welfare, allowing for (partially)
adjustable exposure to morbidity and mortality risks. Despite its generality, our
results show that households’ lifetime decisions are challenging to match, even after
accounting for the complex interactions between them. Whereas financial savings
and pension claims are both well matched, our model overestimates health levels,
and consequently life expectancy. Moreover, health is maintained through more
spending, and less leisure than currently observed. As a consequence, observed
post-retirement income is longer than expected, and explains the divergence in
consumption after 65. Relaxing assumptions on full insurance, and pension regimes
only partially alleviates these discrepancies.
Keywords: Defined Benefits and Contributions Plans, Consumption, Leisure,
Health Expenditures, Mortality and Morbidity Risks. Optimal Savings.
JEL Classification: E21, I12, J26, J32.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and outline
Agents are required to make complex financial, work-, and health-related decisions through-
out their lifetime. A major source of difficulty stems from the fact that these decisions are
intertwined with one another (Hugonnier et al., 2013). Indeed, given current age, health
status, financial wealth and pension entitlement, the agent must decide how much to save,
and how much to spend on current non-medical consumption, on health expenditures,
and how much leisure activities to undertake. Whereas consumption and leisure yield
immediate utility, both the latter and medical expenditures have positive effects on future
health which will in turn determine future exposure to sickness and death risks. Moreover,
current leisure choices affect expected post-retirement income. These pension claims,
combined with exposure to future morbidity and mortality risks, condition the need to set
aside precautionary financial reserves against anticipated health expenses and longevity
risks. Assuming these effects are fully understood, such lifetime allocations would need
to account for the agent’s attitudes towards risks (i.e. financial, death and sickness),
towards time (i.e. inter-temporal substitution in consumption and/or leisure), as well
as towards a-temporal substitution (i.e. between current consumption and leisure to
maintain utility, between health expenditures and leisure to maintain health).
These decisions are further complicated by the time variation in investment opportu-
nities. On the one hand, the passage of time worsens the consequences of not investing
in one’s own health; the aging process further amplifies these consequences. On the
other hand, postponing health care can be optimal if one expects to benefit from future
medical advances, or if currently uninsured, and covered by Medicare later on (Pelgrin
and St-Amour, 2016). Moreover, labor wages follow their own life cycles, peaking around
mid-life and falling thereafter. Institutional features of retirement plans also contribute to
complexity by imposing pension wealth illiquidity before retirement, and by exogenously
setting exposure to financial risks.
Understanding how these lifetime decisions unfold is nonetheless essential if one tries
to replicate observed saving patterns in any asset. Moreover, allowing some degree of
substitution and/or complementarity between human, financial and pension wealth levels
and instruments is paramount when jointly modeling financial and health choices. For
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example, a strategy of living fast (i.e. high current felicity and low future financial
and pension wealth) and dying young (low future health and high expected mortality)
could be optimally selected and implemented. Complementarity between consumption
and leisure would then justify increasing both in order to reduce financial and pension
wealth, whereas substitutability between leisure and health expenditures would warrant
decreasing the latter so as to reduce future health and expected longevity. The higher
exposure to future sickness risks could be justified if contributing to the shortened
longevity and/or if Medicare coverage reduces expected marginal illness costs.
Comparatively to the literature and more precisely to Pelgrin and St-Amour (2016),
we fully endogenize the social security and private pension plan schemes. Usually,
retirement income is simplified as an exogenous process calibrated on data. Whereas
public and private pension asset managements remain independent from one another,
the computational challenge lies in the fact that both pension payments depend on the
life cycle of labor supply decisions made by households. The contribution is also reflected
in the consideration of endogenous morbidity and mortality risks on top of the joint life
cycle households decisions.
The objective of this methodologically oriented paper is to propose a step in that
direction. Towards that aim, we build upon a dynamic model that has all the features
previously discussed. More precisely, allowing for (partially) endogenous exposure to
morbidity and mortality risks, we study the joint life cycle determination of work, financial
and health-related choices, fully accounting for the dynamics in financial, pension, and
human health capitals. Importantly, our modeling framework admits a wide range of
optimal dynamic policies. For instance, a healthy-and-thrifty policy obtains since the
former induces a low discount rate which is conducive to high savings in pension and
financial assets, as well as high investing in future health. Conversely, a live-fast and die-
young policy is optimal for unhealthy agents facing high mortality risks, and therefore
high discount rates, prompting them to favor contemporaneous, over future utility via
high current consumption and leisure. Endogenous health ensures that the positioning
between these alternatives is determined endogenously.
This model is numerically solved, simulated, and estimated structurally. This allows
us to perform a twofold analysis. First, we investigate the effects of current state
variables (financial, and pension wealth, as well as health status) on optimal allocations
2
(work/leisure, consumption and health expenditures). Second, we simulate the model to
compute the optimal state, and life-cycle allocations.
Our main findings with respect to estimated parameters, marginal effects of state
variables, and life cycles may be summarized as follows. Regarding the health pro-
duction function, our estimated parameters indicate that the null hypotheses of health-
independent morbidity and mortality risks, and exogenously set health levels are both
rejected, such that agents’ decisions can effectively impact how healthy they are and how
much they are exposed to sickness and death risks. We also find that the so-called Long
Reach of Childhood (Smith, 2009) is important; past health levels have strong effects on
the productivity of current health investments. Third, we find that aging entails larger
costs of inaction; both deterministic and stochastic health depreciation rates increase
sharply with age. Fourth, our findings with respect to preferences are consistent with
relative complementarity between consumption and leisure, as well as a low degree of
inter-temporal substitution. We also identify a utilitarian cost of death that is attenuated
by a positive motivation for bequest. The latter justifies keeping high financial wealth
balances at old age to be left to heirs in the case of death.1
Complementarity entails that consumption, and leisure display similar positive wealth
gradients, and negative health gradients. Healthier agents face lower death and sickness
risks and save, and work more to accommodate a longer life horizon. Optimal health
spending however is not monotonous. Sufficiently healthy agents cut down spending
when health and wealth improve, preferring to substitute in favor of more leisure in the
latter case. Otherwise, the health and wealth gradients are positive, and unhealthy agents
cut down health expenses, and substitute more leisure when health further deteriorates.
We also identify substitutability between financial and pension wealth with the latter
having minimal independent effect once the former is accounted for.
Despite matching pension and financial wealth very well, our model does not succeed
in replicating health levels and thus agents face a shorter horizon than the one estimated
(79 vs 84 years). In addition, under full health insurance, and age-increasing wages,
health maintenance is achieved by spending more on health investment, and using less
leisure than observed levels. A direct consequence of the gap of leisure after mid-life
is that elders’ observed total (i.e. retirement plus labor) income is smaller than the
1See also De Nardi et al. (2015); Love et al. (2009) for discussion and empirical evidence on the role
of bequests in explaining insufficient post-retirement dissavings.
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estimated one, causing a drop in post-retirement consumption, while the latter increases
when estimated. Put differently, observed behavior is only partly recovered, doing well
with respect to financial decisions and less so with respect to health-related ones.
We revisit some of the model’s key assumption to gauge whether or not they might
improve our findings. First, allowing for a defined benefit plan does yield an optimal
increase in mid-life leisure, however it also predicts healthier and longer-lived agents,
contrary to the data. Second, lowering the return on pension assets forces agents to
cut down on leisure, and increase health spending. The fit further deteriorates as more
financial wealth is required to offset the fall in pension wealth. Third, removing health
insurance for younger agents leads to pre-Medicare health spending cuts, that are only
partially offset by more leisure; health status and longevity consequently deteriorate,
as required. Unfortunately, so does financial wealth as a shorter life horizon no longer
justifies accumulating assets. Finally, we allow for potential myopia of agents by replacing
the predicted health-dependent with the observed age-dependent death intensity. Again
this modification partially explains the differences (e.g. worse health, higher mortality,
lower health investment), yet fails to account for all the gaps between the theory and the
data. We conclude that none of these assumptions is single-handedly responsible for the
discrepancies.
1.2 Institutional background
Work choices are strongly related to the life cycle variation in health-related risks and
decisions. For example, people’s probabilities of being sick and dying increase, the
result of the aging process which depreciates health capital over time, thereby affecting
willingness and capacity to work in old age. Retirement is further associated with a sharp
drop in income. Using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, we notice that retired
households earn on average a third less than working ones. Therefore, retirees dissave by
using financial and pension wealth, to optimally adapt to their new conditions. However,
nowadays, this process begins later than before, mainly because of the more challenging
job market, higher life expectancy and less profitable retirement plans. Put differently,
the retirement is postponed.
Since the 2000s, the way employees contribute to their retirement plan also sig-
nificantly changed. We observe a shift from defined benefits to defined contributions
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retirement plans. In 1998, 50% of the retirement plan were DC-based, while in 2015,
they represented2 95%. This trend has some implications for households. First, they
are more exposed to market risks, since their retirement funds directly depend on the
financial market performance. As an example, during the crisis 2007-2008, the Dow Jones
Industrial Average dropped by 53%. Second, pension income are smaller in the DC case.
Munnell et al. (2015) showed that the annual rate of return of DC plans was 0.7 point
lower than for DB.
In addition to pension capital, financial wealth is the second highest household asset
holding, after real estate, with around 20% of US households’ wealth being invested in
financial securities. The particularity of the US households financial wealth is the fact
that the life cycle profile is hump-shaped. Agents accumulate money until the retirement
period, and then start to spend it. This pattern is observed in the Survey of Consumer
(SCF) 2010, where the average US households financial wealth increases until 60 years
old where it tops at around $38’000, and then decreases to around $20’000 at 80 years
old.
The background analysis shows that the US economic landscape has changed dramat-
ically in recent years. These changes are all linked and have intertwined consequences,
today and in the future. This is where our analysis sheds light on the complexity of this
ecosystem.
1.3 Relevant literature
Relatively few researchers study the joint dynamic determination of health, labor and
financial decisions. French and Jones (2011) build a dynamic programming model that is
also structurally estimated using SME in order to find whether employer-provided health
insurance, Medicare, and Social Security have any impact on the retirement decision.
Their framework includes a complete model of leisure, wealth, retirement, and bequest
motive. However, the pension regime is assumed to be a DB plan for every agent.
Importantly, contrary to us, health is modeled as an exogenous stochastic binary variable
(bad or good health) and health expenditures are also exogenous.
The paper by French (2005) is also based on a dynamic optimization model that
is estimated using SME on life cycle moments. Its aim is to evaluate the role of social
2 Source: Willis Towers Watson.
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security and pension taxation as potential explanation for early retirement observed in the
data. As for French and Jones (2011), binary health is exogenous and stochastic. Earnings
are also stochastic and social security, pension entitlement and spousal income are taken
into account. French (2005) focuses on dynamic decisions regarding consumption, hours
of work and social security application. Workers are able to reenter the labor force even if
they retired early. However, the DC plan is not investigated and neither are endogenous
health investment and out-of-pocket expenditures decisions which we address in our setup.
Fonseca et al. (2013) also estimate a life cycle model with endogenous health, asset
accumulation and retirement in order to evaluate why health spending and longevity
increased in the US from 1965 to 2005. As in French and Jones (2011), early retirement
is possible but is irreversible. Earnings are stochastic and follow an exogenous Gaussian
process. The model also incorporates health status, health shocks (sickness and death),
health insurance, social security, government transfers, spousal earnings, and pension
income modeled as a DB plan, with DC retirement abstracted from. The dynamic
decisions concern the choice of consumption and health expenditures but abstracts from
labor/leisure choices.
Galama et al. (2013) construct a continuous time and structural model of health,
wealth accumulation, and retirement decisions using the human capital framework de-
veloped by Grossman (1972), in order to analyze the effect of health on the decision to
retire. Interestingly, the retirement decision is completely endogenous. They model DB
entitlement, however they do not take into account social security and DC pension.
The focus of Scholz and Seshadri (2013) is similar to French and Jones (2011). The
authors investigate the effect of health insurance on retirement decision. However, the
model is quite different in that it relies on a health production process with endogenous
health expenditures only. Second, they distinguish between working, married, and retired
households. Third, they include both mortality and morbidity risks, as well as uncertainty
on the earnings process. However, compared to our model, the pension plan is unique
and set to DB.
Finally, Samwick and Skinner (2004) rely on an empirical simulation based model with
endogenous earnings process and stochastic rate of returns in order to assess whether DC
agents are better off than DB ones. They analyze cross sectional data and find that the
pension plan type is important in the retirement process. As with us, they argue that it
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is more important to look at the entire life cycle, and not only the post-retirement period,
and claim that any retirement plan difference can be offset by earnings and contribution
adjustments throughout the life cycle. However, they do not include labor/leisure choices,
and abstract from endogenous health-related risks. The welfare analysis is focused on
wealth without evaluating the value function.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the main features of
the theoretical model, with numerical solution methods discussed in Section 3. The main
results are outlined in Section 4, with discussion in Section 5.
2 Model
This section outlines the life cycle allocations problem of an agent facing partially diversi-
fiable mortality and morbidity risks. These decisions concern consumption (medical and
non-medical) and savings, as well as leisure and work in a setting where health insurance
and pension plan characteristics are taken as exogenous. Both health expenditures and
leisure improve the depreciable health status which in turn lowers the likelihood of death
and sickness. However, leisure entails both present and future costs in foregone current
income, and lower future retirement benefits. We first present the dynamics of the two
health-related risks. Then, following a discussion of pre- and post-retirement income
processes, we describe the budget constraint and agent’s preferences.
2.1 Health shocks and status dynamics
In the spirit of Pelgrin and St-Amour (2016), and Hugonnier et al. (2013) let t =
0, 1, . . . , TM ≤ T denote the age of an agent, where TM is the age of death, and T
is the maximal longevity. We let kt ∈ {0, 1} denote mortality (k = m) and morbidity
(k = s) shocks following generalized Bernoulli processes with:
Pr[kt+1 = 0 | Ht] = exp[−λk(Ht)] (1)
where λk : R+ → R++ is a decreasing and convex intensity function of the health level
Ht. Hence, healthier agents can partially lower their exposure to morbidity and mortality
risks subject to diminishing returns, and incompressible lower bounds. The age of death
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is the first positive occurrence of the death shock:
TM = min {t : mt = 1} . (2)
Relying on a long tradition in the demand-for-health literature, health is modeled
as a depreciable human capital that can be adjusted through health expenditures. We
follow recent advances that append healthy leisure, morbidity shocks and time-varying
depreciation and productivity to the law of motion:
Ht+1 =
(
1− δt − φtst+1
)
Ht + AtI
g(Ht, It, `t). (3)
Denoting I the unit vector, we let Ig : R+ × R+ × I → R+, define the increasing and
concave gross investment function of health status, expenditures It, and leisure `t. Note
that this framework only allows for beneficial effects of leisure on health, i.e. we abstract
from detrimental ”couch potatoes” habits. We partially account for this limitation
through diminishing returns to leisure in the gross investment function Ig(H, I, `). The
capital depreciates at age-dependent deterministic rate δt which is augmented by φt upon
occurrence of sickness. Time-varying depreciation and productivity rates are obtained by
letting dˆt = g
d ≥ 0 for d ∈ {δ, φ, A}. This assumption is convenient to ensure that both
health maintenance, and sickness become increasingly costly as one ages, although this
effect is somewhat mitigated by access to better medical technology in At.
2.2 Retirement plans and income processes
2.2.1 Retirement plans
We first define TR = 65 as the age at which both public and private retirement benefits
can be drawn (henceforth the retirement age). For tractability, that age is taken as given
and cannot be chosen by the agent. In order to account for the growing trend in elders’
participation in the labor market, we do not impose complete and irreversible retirement
from work activities after TR, that is we allow for work (1 − `t) ∈ I,∀t ∈ [16, TM ].
It follows that pre-retirement income is composed of labor income only, whereas post-
retirement income is the sum of labor income, and retirement benefits.3
3Note that this formulation does not exclude corner solutions in which the agent optimally selects
not to work after retirement age, i.e. `t = 1, t ≥ TR.
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We consider two private retirement plans, DC and DB, and one public plan (Social
Security). Both private plans have in common that the contributions are calculated as
shares of the cumulated labor income. For tractability, we assume that these shares
are paid into the retirement fund only up to retirement age. In the DB fund, the cost
of those contributions are paid entirely by the employer, whereas the cost is shared
between employer and employee in the DC case. While the retirement benefit is non-
stochastic in the DB case, it depends on the cumulated portfolio return involving risky
assets for the DC plan. Since the majority of US workers with pension plans are under
defined contributions schemes,4 DC plans will be our main assumption, although we will
evaluate the effect of DB plans in our policy analysis in Section 4.4.1. Finally, Social
Security (also known as Primary Insurance Amount, or PIA) is qualitatively similar to
the DB plan, with non-stochastic returns, although involving a more complex entitlement
formula detailed in Appendix A.
2.2.2 Income process
Let 1Rt = 1t≥TR denote the post-retirement age indicator let r ∈ {DC,DB} denote the
private retirement plan, and Yt, Y
r
t respectively denote the income, and private pension
income, with wt the after-tax wage rate. The income process is characterized by:
Yt =
[
1− (1− 1Rt ) τ rw]wt(1− `t) + 1Rt (PIAt + Y rt ) (4)
Y rt = α
rW rt (5)
W rt+1 =
[
W rt +
(
1− 1Rt
)
Xrt
]
Rrt+1 (6)
Xrt = min
{(
τ rw + τ
r
f
)
wt(1− `t), Xrmax
}
. (7)
The specific values of the plan-specific parameters and variables are outlined in Table 1.
Employees can thus work at all ages in (4), but contribute a share τ rw to pension plans
costs only up to retirement age, where that contribution is τDCw > 0 under DC, and is zero
under DB. After retirement, they receive Social Security PIAt, and the private pension
income Y rt they are entitled to, in addition to any labor income wt(1− `t) they optimally
4Pension coverage type has evolved from DB to DC plans (Munnell and Perun, 2006; Broadbent et
al., 2006). Indeed, Munnell (2013) reports that over the 1983-2013 period, DB shares fell from 62% to
17% of workers with pension coverage, whereas DC shares increased from 12% to 71% over the same
period.
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Table 1: Pension plan-specific rules
plan r DC (benchmark) DB
τ rw τ
DC
w 0
τ rf τ
DC
f τ
DB
f
αr αDC 1
Xrmax X
DC
max ∞
Rrt R
f + ω(Ret −Rft ) 1
select. The pension income (5) is an annuity αr applied on cumulated pension wealth
W rt , where the latter is calculated in (6) as the contributions X
r
t that are cumulated only
up to retirement age. The contributions represent the sum of the worker’s and employer’s
shares τ rw + τ
r
f of labor income in (7), up to maximal amount X
r
max, where the latter is
bounded under DC and unbounded under DB. Finally, the portfolio return on pension
balances Rrt+1 is obtained under the DC plan from investing a share ω ∈ (0, 1) in the risky
asset with return Ret+1, and the balance in the risk-free asset with return R
f
t+1, whereas
the DB plan pays no net return.
Regarding public pension, the Primary Insurance Amount PIAt is the Social Security
income computed using the (annualized) AIMEt, where the Average Indexed Monthly
Earnings defined as:
PIAt = PIA(AIMEt) (8)
AIMEt({`s}ts=16) =
1
t
t∑
s=16
ws(1− `s) (9)
where the exact PIA formula follows Social Security rules and is given in (31) in Ap-
pendix A.
To our knowledge, no paper models in such a detailed way the life cycle income
process through the life cycle. This is what mainly distinguishes it from Pelgrin and St-
Amour (2016). However, we are fully aware of the limitation brought by the assumption
of exogenous timing to claim for retirement benefits (i.e fixed at TR = 65 years old).
Therefore there is still space for improvement of the fit but at the expense of an extensive
computational time.
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2.3 Budget constraint
Following Pelgrin and St-Amour (2016), agents can insure against health expenditures
through a contract defined by (i) a deductible level Dt > 0, (ii) a co-payment rate
ψ ∈ (0, 1) applicable on health expenditures P It It above deductible, and (iii) an insurance
premium Πt. The latter is equal to the market premium for young insured agents, and
to the Medicare-subsidized premium for elders.
Let 1D = 1P It It≥Dt denote the deductible reached indicator. The out-of-pocket medical
expenditures OOPt(It), and health insurance premia are defined as follows:
OOPt(It) =
(
1− 1D)P It It + 1D [Dt + ψ (P It It −Dt)] (10)
Πt = (1− 1Rt pi)Π (11)
where medical prices and deductibles grow at rate xˆt = g
x, for x = P,D to parallel the
growth in medical productivity. The insurance contract in (10) is standard in that the
insured agent covers all medical expenditures P II up to deductible D and pays the latter
plus a share ψ on expenses above D once the deductible is reached. The premia (11) has
agents cover the market premia Π until 65, and the Medicare-subsidized premia (1−pi)Π
afterwards.
Given these elements, the law of motion for financial wealth Wt is obtained as:
Wt+1 = [Wt + Yt − Ct −OOPt − Πt]Rf (12)
where Ct is non-medical consumption, pre- and post-retirement income Yt is given in (4),
out-of-pocket health expenditures OOPt are in (10), and health insurance premia Πt is
given in (11). The budget constraint is expressed as a standard financial wealth process.
At period t, agents hold financial wealth equal to Wt, receive an income Yt. They make
the choice to consume Ct, spend OOPt as health expenses and pay their health insurance
Πt . The remaining wealth is invested at the risk free rate R
f .
2.4 Preferences
As shown in Pelgrin and St-Amour (2016), and Hugonnier et al. (2013), the agent’s
dynamic problem with time-separable VNM preferences, stochastic horizon TM , and
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constant discounting β ∈ (0, 1) can be rewritten as a deterministic horizon program with
health-dependent, endogenous discounting:
βm(Ht) = β exp[−λm(Ht)] < β. (13)
Moreover, let the instantaneous utility be defined as:
Ut = U(Ct, `t) + [β − βm(Ht)]Um (Wt, Y rt ) ,
= U(Ct, `t,Wt, Ht, Y rt )
(14)
where U : R++ × I → R+ and Um : R+ × R+ → R− are monotone increasing, and
concave instantaneous, and bequest utility functions that satisfy U : R++ × I × R+ ×
R+ ×R+ → R+. Since λm(·) is a decreasing function, the healthier agent thus behaves
as a more patient individual in (13), and assigns a lower weight on the bequest utility
in (14). Observe further that, since Um is increasing and negative, the marginal utility
Ux ≥ 0, x = W,H, Y r, ensuring positive instantaneous value to bequeathed wealth and
pension entitlement, as well as to health.
Taking current health Ht, wealth Wt, and pension income Y
r
t as given, the agent’s
dynamic programming problem is:
V rt = max
Ct,It,`t
Ut + βm(Ht)E
[
V rt+1 | Ht
]
(15)
where V rt = V (Wt, Ht, Y
r
t ) ≥ 0 is the value function, and the period utility Ut is given
in (14). The optimization (15) is subject to (i) the Bernoulli distribution (1), (ii) the
law of motion for health (3), (iii) the retirement income process (6), and (iv) the budget
constraint (12).
The model admits a wide range of optimal life cycle strategies depending on the struc-
tural preference, technological, and distributional parameters. For instance, a healthy-
and-thrifty policy obtains naturally as a high H induces a low discount rate λm(H),
and high patience βm(H) in (13), which is conducive to high savings in pension and
financial assets, as well as high investing in future health. Conversely, a live-fast and die-
young policy can be warranted for unhealthy agents with very high mortality risks, – and
therefore high discount rates – and low βm(H), encouraging them to favor contempora-
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neous, over future utility via high current consumption and leisure. Importantly, because
health is endogenous, the positioning between these various alternatives is determined
endogenously. Our empirical strategy is therefore centered on structurally identifying the
deep parameters through the data so as to match observed life cycle decisions.
3 Empirical Methods
This section describes the empirical strategy that we use to solve and estimate the
model via a Simulated Moments Estimation (SME). Following the discussion about the
functional forms, we outline the iterative and simulation procedures, and present the SME
estimator. An overview of the data used in the estimation strategy closes the section.
3.1 Functional forms
We draw from Pelgrin and St-Amour (2016) and Hugonnier et al. (2013) in parameterizing
the death and sickness intensity functions λkt (Ht), gross investment I
g(H, I, `), and the
instantaneous utility and bequest functions U(C, `), Um(W,Y r) as follows:
λm(H) = λm0 + λ
m
1 H
−ξm , (16)
λs(H) = λs2 −
λs2 − λs0
1 + λs1H
−ξs , (17)
Ig(H, I, `) = IηI`η`H1−ηI−η` , (18)
U(C, `) =
1
1− ε
[
µcC
1−γ + µ``1−γ
] 1−ε
1−γ , (19)
Um(W,Y r) =
µm (W + δ
rY r)1−γm
1− γm (20)
Consistent with the model, the two intensities in (16), and (17) are decreasing and
convex in health, and bounded below by λk0, whereas λ
k
1 determines the endogeneity
of sickness and health shocks. The Cobb-Douglas specification for gross investment (18)
allows for monotone increasing, concave effects of health, expenditures and leisure inputs.
The instantaneous utility (19) is specified as a CES to maintain positive utilitarian flows
from living. In the spirit of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), we allow for differences in
the intra- (1/γ) and inter-temporal (1/ε) elasticities of substitution. The bequest utility
function (20) is negative and reflects a cost of dying for γm > 1; that cost is attenuated by
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leaving bequests equal to financial wealth plus pension income entitlements for surviving
heirs. Finally, the gross risky return Ret under the DC plan is assumed to be log-normally
distributed, with mean µe, and variance σ
2
e .
3.2 Iteration and simulation
Let Zt = (Wt, Ht, Y
r
t ) and Qt = (Ct, It, `t) respectively denote the state and control sets
at time t, with Z ∈ Z representing a given element of the discretized state space. We
also let t = (
m
t , 
s
t , 
e
t ) denote the death, sickness and financial shocks. The iterative step
consists of solving the program (15) through a backward iteration:
V (Zt) = max
Qt
U(Qt, Zt) + βm(Zt)E [V (Zt+1) | Zt] (21)
s.t. Zt+1 = Zt+1(Qt, Zt, t+1), ∀Zt = Z ∈ Z. (22)
The output we recover is thus the sequence of age-dependent optimal allocations and
value functions on each point in the state space:
{Qt(Z), Vt(Z)}Tt=16 , ∀Z ∈ Z (23)
Next, we simulate the dynamic optimal paths for agents i = 1, 2, . . . , KI , and Monte-
Carlo replication n = 1, 2, . . . , KN as follows:
1. The initial state draws (with replacement) from the observed population wealth,
health levels at age 15:5
Zi,n15 ∼ ZPOP15 . (24)
2. For each year t = 16, 17, . . . T ,
(a) A trilinear interpolation of the policy functions (23) is used to evaluateQi,nt , V
i,n
t
at the contemporary state Zi,nt .
5The initial pension entitlement Y r15 is set at the minimum point on the discretized state space.
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(b) Death and sickness shocks are endogenously drawn from the generalized Bernoulli,
k,i,nt+1 ∼ {0, 1}2 | λk(Zi,nt ). (25)
(c) Financial shocks are drawn from the log-normal distribution:
log(Ret+1) ∼ N.I.D.(µe, σ2e) (26)
(d) We use the laws of motion (22) to update the state variables:
Zi,nt+1 = Zt+1
(
Qi,nt , Z
i,n
t , 
i,n
t+1
)
. (27)
3.3 Moments and SME estimation
Given the output sequence
{
Qi,nt , V
i,n
t , Z
i,n
t
}
, the theoretical life-cycle Mˆt and uncondi-
tional moments Mˆu need to be calculated for the population of living agents only. For
that purpose, let 1i,nt ∈ {1,NaN} be the alive indicator for agent i, in simulation n, at
age t. The life-cycle and unconditional moments are given by:6
Mˆt =
∑KI
i=1
∑KN
n=1 1
i,n
t
{
Qi,nt , V
i,n
t , Z
i,n
t
}∑KI
i=1
∑KN
n=1 1
i,n
t
, (28)
Mˆu =
∑T
t=16 Mˆt
T − 16 . (29)
These life-cycle moments can be contrasted with observed ones to construct a Simulated
Moments Estimator (SME, e.g. Duffie and Singleton, 1993; Keane and Wolpin, 1994;
French, 2005).
For that purpose, define Θ = (Θe,Θc) the estimated and calibrated parameter set.
Let Mˆ(Θ) = {Mˆt(Θ)} ∈ RKM denote the collection of theoretical life cycle moments
of interest, and M denote the corresponding observed moments. For a given weighting
6In practice we rely on the nanmean function in Matlab to avoid factoring in the deaths in computing
the moments.
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matrix Ω ∈ RKM×KM , the SME estimation of the structural parameters Θe is:
Θˆe = argmin
Θe
[
Mˆ(Θ)−M
]′
Ω
[
Mˆ(Θ)−M
]
. (30)
The calibrated and estimated parameters are discussed in further details below. We
compute the theoretical life cycle moments for health, wealth, leisure, out-of-pocket
expenditures, and the annual mortality rates over 5-year intervals for ages between 20–80.
The corresponding observed moments are discussed below and refer to the US population
for the years 2010 and 2011. By using 5 life cycle variables times 12 five-year bins, meaning
a total of KM = 60 moments, the Simulated Moments Estimation of Θ
e is clearly over-
identified since we estimate 23 deep parameters.
The SME methods require observed life cycle moments on wealth, health, leisure, and
out-of-pocket health expenditures. Ideally, a single panel database regrouping all these
variables would be used. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, such a database
does not exist. Another limitation concerns the type of data. Since we are not able
to use panel data, the risk is for the model to capture a cohort effect and not a pure
life cycle effects. Following literature’s best practice (Pelgrin and St-Amour, 2016), we
rely on separate well-known panels that are representative of the American population.
These sources are presented in Table 4. First, for financial wealth, we rely on the Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF). Our measure for financial wealth includes assets (stocks,
bonds, banking accounts, ...). Second, leisure is the share of time spent not working,
and is taken from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS). Third, we use the National
Health Interview Survey (NHIS) to get a measure of health. Indeed, this survey includes
ordered qualitative self-reported health status ranging from very poor to excellent that
are converted to numerical measures using a linear scale. Fourth, the total (Consumer
Expenditures Survey, CEX) and out-of-pocket medical expenses (Medical Expenditures
Survey, MEPS), are the mean expenses per person, conditional upon expenditures.
Finally, the retirement plans also require administrative and statistical information
on retirement income in order to parametrize the Social Security, DB, and DC formulas
(e.g Average Monthly Index Earnings thresholds, DC annuity factor). To compute social
security benefits, we use 2010 and 2011 data from the U.S Social Security Administration.
However, we fix the DB contribution rate τDBf and the DC annuity factor α
DC by
averaging different literature sources since no survey exist on these parameters.
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4 Results
We first discuss the estimated parameters, followed by a presentation of the output
obtained from the iteration and simulation phases. We close this section by discussing
the role of alternative key assumptions.
4.1 Parameters
Calibration set The values and sources for the calibrated parameters Θc are shown
in Table 5.a (values), and .b (sources). These parameter values were selected relying on
data, official figures, and literature as much as possible. The remaining free parameters
concern the range and dimension of the state, and control spaces, and were calibrated
through an extensive trial and error procedure.
Estimation set The estimated parameters Θe are reported in Table 6, with standard
errors in parentheses. The latter indicate that all the parameters in Θe are precisely
estimated, and have the correct expected signs. In panel 6.a, the mortality intensity
λm(H) parameters in (16) confirm that the endowed death intensity λm0 is low. The weight
and curvature parameters with respect to health indicate that death risk is diversifiable
(λm1 , ξ
m 6= 0). Next, the sickness intensity process in (17) unsurprisingly reveals a much
higher exposure to sickness than to death risk (λs(Ht) > λ
m(Ht),∀Ht). Moreover, the
parameters are consistent with endogenous exposure (λs1, ξ
s 6= 0), as well as with a high
endowed intensity, and the absence of bounds on sickness risk exposure (λs0, λ
s
2  0).
In panel 6.b, the deterministic depreciation δt is non-trivial, and age-increasing.
Conditional upon sickness, the incremental depreciation that is suffered by the agent
is found to be consequential (φt > δt), and more age-dependent than its deterministic
counterpart (gφ > gδ). All in all, this suggests that the health capital falls rapidly in the
absence of constant maintenance, that the sickness process we identify is associated with
severe, rather than benign illness, and whose consequences are much more detrimental
for elders, than for young agents. The gross investment function (18) that we estimate
is indicative of medical technological progress (gA > 0), and of positive, diminishing
marginal products of investment and leisure in maintaining health (ηI , η` ∈ (0, 1)).
Moreover, the large marginal effect of health in the gross investment (ηH ≡ 1−ηI−η` > 0)
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suggests path dependence in the sense that not all contemporary health issues may be
solved through high expenditures and healthy leisure only.
Turning to preferences in panel 6.c, the CES utility (19) that we estimate is charac-
terized by low intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption
(1/γ  1) that is consistent with known estimates of Frisch elasticity, and indicative
of relative complementarity between consumption and leisure.7 Moreover, we observe a
strong importance of leisure relative to consumption in the utility function (µ` > µC),
as well as a high inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 1/ε 1. The estimates of the
bequest function (20) suggest a utility cost of death (γm > 1), and realistic relative risk
aversion with respect to stochastic financial risk (γm = 2.09). The bequest motive is also
found to be non-negligible (µm > 0).
Finally, in panel 6.d, the growth in medical productivity that we identify (gA > 0) is
paralleled with medical prices inflation (gP > 0), that is accompanied by a corresponding
increase in deductibles (gD > 0). Observe that medical prices augment more rapidly than
both medical technology and deductibles (gP > gD > gA).
4.2 Optimal allocations
Figure 1 in Appendix C.1 plots the mean optimal consumption (panel a), leisure (panel b),
health investment (panel c), and welfare (panel d) in function of financial wealth (W ), and
health (H), where the mean is taken across the age, and retirement wealth dimensions.
Figure 2 plots these variables in the retirement wealth, and health space (WR, H), where
the mean is taken across the age, and financial wealth dimensions, whereas Figure 3 plots
these variables in the (WR,W ) space, where the mean is taken across the age, and health
dimensions.
First, the optimal consumption in Figure 1.a is monotone increasing in wealth, and
decreasing in health. Whereas the wealth effects are as expected, the negative health
gradient can be explained by the lower discounting for healthier agents who prefer to
consume less, and save more at a given wealth level, in order to account for a longer life
horizon. Second, the optimal leisure choice in Figure 1.b displays strong similarities with
consumption, due to the complementarities that was previously estimated (1/γ  1).
Again, it is unsurprisingly increasing in financial wealth, and decreasing in health, where
7See Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, pp. 51-52) among others.
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the latter obtains because healthy agents face lower death, and sickness risks exposure
and can select to work more when health improves. Observe that the sufficiently healthy
and rich agents elect not to work, and take full leisure (` = 1) instead.
Third, the optimal investment in Figure 1.c is non-monotone in both wealth and
health. Sufficiently healthy agents tend to substitute away from health spending, and
in favor of leisure when wealth increases; otherwise, the wealth gradient of spending
is positive for the unhealthy. Moreover, health spending falls in health for sufficiently
healthy agents, but increases for unhealthy individuals. Very unhealthy agents, facing a
near unit probability of further sickness and death, thus prefer to cut down on spending,
and take full leisure instead when health further deteriorates. This choice is sensible as
leisure provides instantaneous utility, whereas spending does not. Finally, as expected,
the welfare in Figure 1.d is monotone increasing in both financial wealth and health.
Note that the strong convexities in the adjustment costs of gross investment Ig(H, I, `),
and of risk exposure λk(H) entails that the curvature is more pronounced with respect
to H, than W .
Figures 2, and 3 both isolate the effects of retirement wealth on the optimal allocations
and on welfare. The retirement wealth gradient is found to be very similar to financial
wealth (Fig. 2), yet is moderate once the latter is accounted for (Fig. 3). Indeed, replac-
ing financial, with retirement wealth yields very similar policies in the (WR, H) space,
whereas averaging across health and expressing the policies in (WR,W ) space shows
negligible marginal effects of retirement wealth, once financial net worth is accounted
for. Again, the substitution away from health spending (panel c) and in favor of leisure
(panel b) for wealthier agents is apparent. All in all, this suggests substitutability between
financial and retirement wealth, once health status and age are integrated across.
4.3 Optimal life cycles
To isolate the effects of age, the optimal life cycle trajectories are reported in Figure 4
in Appendix C.2. They are computed as the mean of the simulated paths at a given age
using (28). We plot the benchmark simulated allocation (red), along with standard errors
(dotted red), and the corresponding observed data (black). Overall, these results confirm
that our benchmark model performs well in reproducing the shape of the life cycle paths,
with some notable exceptions.
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Indeed, panel 4.a illustrates that the secular drop in health levels is accurately re-
produced. However, the level is not, indicating that agents in the model are healthier
compared to the observed ones. Consequently, their exposure to mortality risk (panel b)
is smaller, and their life horizon is longer than it should be (79.3 years in the data vs 83.9
years predicted).
Moreover, predicted spending (panel c) is overestimated, and leisure, while exag-
gerated before mid-life, is insufficient afterwards (panel d). Complete health insurance
coverage suggests that agents in the model should also substitute more leisure with less
health spending to maintain health and reconcile with observed data.
Third, despite pension income adequacy (panel e), insufficient leisure and excessive
work imply the estimated total income to be overestimated after mid-life (panel f). The
predicted consumption level is also insufficient before mid-life, and clearly above what
is observed after 65 (panel g). Put differently, theoretical prediction of consumption is
growing too strongly compared with observed data. Despite insufficient pre-retirement
consumption, high predicted health spending and pre-retirement leisure entails that
observed and predicted financial wealth paths coincide throughout lifetime (panel h).
The old-age increase in estimated consumption is therefore attributable to higher labor
income, and not to excessive wealth or pension claims.
4.4 Alternative specifications
We now analyze the effects of relaxing several key assumptions in the theoretical model
in order to verify how the empirical performance can be affected. First, we replace our
DC assumption with one where individuals are covered by a defined benefit (DB) plan.
Second, we allow for potential mis-management of pension funds by altering the risk-
return mix on the pension assets’ portfolio. Third, we account for the fact that many
young agents remain uninsured with respect to health spending. Fourth, we allow for
potential myopia with respect to the endogeneity of death risk exposure. Keeping the
deep parameters constant, the model is solved and simulated again for each alternative.
In Appendix C.3, we plot the observed Xt (black), benchmark Xˆt (red) and alternative
X˜t (blue) life cycles.
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4.4.1 DB pension plans
As discussed earlier, recent trends have witnessed a fall in DB-type pension plans in favor
of DC regimes, prompting us to adopt a defined contribution perspective. Still, defined
benefits remain important for many workers, and the model is modified accordingly. The
effects on predicted life cycles are reported in Figure 5.
DB plans are often considered to be more generous than their DC counterparts, and
this is reflected in much higher pension claims (panel e). The latter encourages DB
workers to take an early retirement path (panel d) which results in limited post-retirement
improvements in health (panel a), and moderately lower mortality (panel b). Moreover,
more mid-life leisure entails that health expenditures can be substituted away (panel c),
leading to more pre-retirement financial wealth (panel h). Because pension income is
higher, consumption at mid-life can be accelerated (panel g), and causes financial wealth
to recede more rapidly after retirement.
4.4.2 Lower return on the pension assets
We have imposed a risky portfolio share ω = 60% on DC pension assets. Potential mis-
management may result in lower shares which will reduce the rate of return on pension
funds, and therefore the post-retirement pension claims. For that purpose, we reduce ω
to 30%. The effects on predicted life cycles are reported in Figure 6.
As expected, lower returns on pension assets results in a decline in pension income
(panel e), and post-retirement total income (panel f), forcing the agent to cut down on
leisure, and increase hours worked (panel d). The drop in leisure is mostly compensated
by increased health spending (panel c), such that both health (panel a), and mortality
(panel b) remain unaffected. The drop in the value of pension wealth forces the agent to
increase financial wealth (panel h), by cutting down consumption (panel g).
4.4.3 Uninsured young agents
Our model assumes full insurance for young and old agents alike. Yet, before PPAC-A
becomes fully operational, a sizable share of the US younger population remains uninsured
with respect to health risks.8 To analyze the effects of uninsurance, we modify the
8Hence, 32 millions (16.7%) non elderly Americans remained uninsured in 2014 (Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation, 2015).
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model to let young agents face the full price of health expenditures, while allowing for
full Medicare coverage for elders. The changes with respect to the initial theoretical
predictions are reported in Figure 7.
First, uninsured young agents are unsurprisingly in worse health than insured indi-
viduals (panel a), and consequently face a higher mortality risk exposure (panel b). As
expected they substitute away from costly health spending (panel c), and in favor of more
leisure (panel d) so as to maintain health. As Medicare becomes operational after 65,
they reverse these choices by spending more, and cutting down on leisure. The latter is
however too late to offset a fall in pension income (panel e), while pre-retirement drop in
hours worked results in important cuts in labor revenues (panel f). A shorter expected life
span, and higher price of medical expenditures mean that both post-retirement financial
wealth (panel h), and consumption (panel g) are reduced.
4.4.4 Myopic health risks
Finally we consider an alternative where agents correctly anticipate the mean death risk
at any given age, but are myopic to the possibility of altering these risks through their
health decisions. The results in Figure 8 thus replace the theoretical death intensity by
λ˜mt obtained by projecting the observed death intensities at age t, obtained from the Life
Tables on a constant, and on age. Agents are thus myopic in omitting to account for the
endogenous dependence of their risk exposure on their own adjustable health, λmt (Ht).
9
As expected, removing the endogeneity of death risk exposure reduces the attractive-
ness of spending resources to maintain health. Consequently, both investment (panel c),
and leisure (panel d, after age 55) fall sharply, inducing a sharp drop in health level
(panel a), and an increased mortality (panel b) compared to our benchmark theoretical
model. More work for elders translates to higher total income (panel f), despite a drop
in pension revenues (panel e). Finally, a shorter expected lifetime reduces the need to
maintain financial wealth balances (panel h), which is sufficiently important as to force
a cut in post-retirement consumption (panel g).
9Qualitatively similar results are obtained by replacing the projected mortality rate by the actual
rate.
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5 Discussion
This paper’s objective is to assess whether observed life cycle choices by agents with re-
spect to health, leisure/work, and consumption/savings can be matched using a dynamic
life cycle model that takes into account the interactions between agents’ decisions.
Our modeling strategy evolves around a flexible dynamic optimization framework
that can accommodate many optimal dynamic policies. In particular, endogenous expo-
sure to future morbidity and mortality risks, as well as future consequences of current
leisure choices on future pension entitlement are fully internalized. A key difference
with previous studies is that life cycle health-, financial, and work-related choices are
thus analyzed jointly, rather than separately to assess financial and health adequacy.
Moreover, structural estimation of the model ensures a one-to-one mapping between the
theory and the empirical assessment.
Based on the previous results, we can hardly conclude that observed choices are fully
explained by our model. Whereas financial savings and pension claims do not appear
to be inadequate (i.e. agents are thrifty), individuals in the data are less healthy, and
consequently face a shorter horizon than agents in our estimations. Moreover, assuming
full insurance optimally points to more spending, and less leisure to maintain health than
currently observed. As a consequence, post-retirement income is too high, and explains
a sharp increase in consumption after 65 that is inconsistent with households’ behavior.
In order to assess the general fit of the model, we performed the Sargan-Hansen
test (Hansen, 1982), i.e. J-test, to test the over-identifying restrictions. By using the
parametric bootstrap method (Hall and Horowitz, 1996), the J-test gives the following
conclusion: Jhat = 43.60 < 52.19 = J0.95 where J0.95 is chi-square distributed with 37
degrees of freedom. Therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% level, i.e.
the estimated model of life cycle allocations adequately describes the observed data.
A fair concern is whether our underlying assumptions stand behind the model’s
inability to fully reproduce the data. To address this question, we relaxed several key
hypotheses. First, to account for a sizable (although receding) share of the population
covered by defined benefit pension plans, we allowed for DB regimes instead of our
assumed defined contribution plan. Relaxing the pension plan hypothesis only partially
improves the results. Whereas the model predicts that leisure should increase after mid-
life, health spending is lower for DB agents. However, both effects offset one another with
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respect to health maintenance such that DB agents are similarly healthy, and long-living
than their DC counterparts.Moreover, the predicted consumption, and financial wealth
life cycles diverge further from the observed values.
Second, to account for potential mismanagement of pension fund leading to lower rates
of return on asset holdings, we reduced the portfolio share on risky assets. Since the latter
pay a positive risk premia, this results in cutting down the value of pension claims. How-
ever, the effects on health levels, mortality are negligible, whereas investment increases,
and leisure falls counter-factually. Moreover, the effects on income, consumption, and
wealth are weak, leading to no improvement in model performance.
Third, before PPAC-A becomes operational, important shares of young US population
remain uninsured for health expenses. Replacing our full insurance hypothesis by a no
insurance for younger and Medicare-covered insurance for elders also provides partial
improvement, with much more potent effects on health-related variables. First, predicted
health falls sharply, and mortality rates increase and become closer to those observed in
the data. However, uninsured young agents also substitute away from spending and in
favor of more leisure, leading to a deterioration of performance on both fronts. Moreover,
post-retirement wealth falls sharply because of the shorter expected lifetime, leading to
further inconsistencies.
Fourth, we also considered potential myopia with respect to mortality risks by re-
placing the death endogenous intensity with an age-increasing, but health-independent
version, such that agents correctly expect their death exposure on average, but fail to
internalize the positive impacts of healthy choices on longevity. Again this modification
holds some promises, yet is insufficient to account for all the differences between predicted,
and observed behavior. In particular, as we remove the longevity value of better health,
predicted health deteriorates strongly via lower expenses and leisure. Moreover, post-
retirement consumption is pro-factually much lower, but results from counter-factual
drops in financial wealth for elders.
Finally, different functional forms were tested as robustness checks10. For instance,
death and sickness risk exposures were tested as functions of age in addition to health.
Age-increasing incidence could reduce the attractiveness of investing in one’s health and
could help reconciling the model with the data. It turns out that results were not improved
10Results can be provided upon request.
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compared to the ones obtained using the functional forms reported in Section 3. We also
tried to incorporate health in the utility function, as in the Grossman model of health
demand, i.e. using U(C,H, `) instead of U(C, `) for the period utility. Intuitively, being
healthy (i.e. high health stock) allows agents to spend more time on other activities and
it also brings them direct welfare. But again, the fitting was not improved.
Overall, we conclude that the discrepancies between the data and the estimated
allocation cannot be solely attributed to excessive assumptions related to pension, or
health insurance regime, nor through those regarding the forward-looking aptitudes of
agents. Other alternative explanations include real estate which has been omitted from
the analysis. Higher post-retirement leisure could be explained by more liquid wealth
incorporated in house value, allowing less work for elders. A shorter life horizon induced
by unhealthy behavior could also be rationalized by more bequest utility from bequeathed
housing wealth. A further alternative could be limitations preventing elders’ participation
in the labor market. For instance fiscal, means-testing or Social Security penalties on post-
retirement labor income, or employers’ reluctance to hire elders could explain excessive
leisure for elders. In addition, the endogenous decision of retiring would give the real life
flexibility to agents, and could help to reconcile with end of life pension and leisure choices.
Furthermore, the current estimation is only based on matching the first moment (mean).
Adding higher ones such as variance could help to increase the accuracy and could match
the most challenging shapes. Finally, relaxing the assumption of a single type of leisure,
and allowing for a neutral or even a unhealthy leisure could help at matching the health
profile. We leave these and other potential explanations on the research agenda.
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A Social Security
Given the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings AIMEt, the Social Security income is
obtained as:
PIAt = min
{
αPIA1 min
(
AIMEt, Cap
AIME
1
)
+
αPIA2 max
[
0,min
(
AIMEt − CapAIME1 , CapAIME2 − CapAIME1
)]
+
αPIA3 max
(
0, AIMEt − CapAIME2
)
, P IAmax
}
(31)
Note that in order to reduce the dimension of the state space, the Social Security income
can also be expressed as a function of Y DBt :
AIMEt =
1
TEτDBf
Y DBt (32)
such that (31) becomes:
PIAt = min
{
αPIA1 min
(
Y DBt
t× τDBf
, CapAIME1
)
+αPIA2 max
[
0,min
(
Y DBt
t× τDBf
− CapAIME1 , CapAIME2 − CapAIME1
)]
+αPIA3 max
(
0,
Y DBt
t× τDBf
− CapAIME2
)
, P IAmax
}
(33)
where we set TE = 49, and τDBf = 0.014 in AIME (32).
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B Tables
Table 2: Asset Allocation and percentage share invested in equities for DC plans
% of 401(k) in equities Age 20’s Age 60’s Average
0 0.9 0.16 0.0
(0,20] 0.1 0.8 0.1
(20,40] 0.2 0.14 0.3
(40,60] 0.5 0.26 0.5
(60,80] 0.19 0.16 0.7
(80,100] 0.64 0.20 0.9
Average 0.74 0.48 0.6
Notes: Equities include equity funds, company stock, and the equity portion of balanced fund.
Funds include mutual funds, bank collective trusts, life insurance separate accounts, and any
pooled investment product invested primarily in the security indicated. Source: Tabulations
from EBRI/ICI Participant-Directed Retirement Plan Data Collection Project (ICI, 2013).
Table 3: Joint Survivor Annuity for a $100’000 investment in 2010-2011
100% Joint Survivor Monthly Annuity for $100’000 invested
Age 01.01.2010 01.07.2010 01.01.2011 01.07.2011 Average
65 494 480 481 465 480
70 538 524 526 508 524
75 596 580 596 566 584.5
80 684 668 675 649 669
50% Joint Survivor Monthly Annuity for $100’000 invested
Age 01.01.2010 01.07.2010 01.01.2011 01.07.2011 Average
65 575 559 555 538 556.75
70 643 627 623 609 625.5
75 734 717 713 699 715.75
80 870 851 846 829 849
δr = 0.5
αa
and αa = 12× $556.75/$100’000 = 0.067
Notes: Sources: www.immediateannuities.com/annuity-shopper/as-archive.html
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Table 4: Data sources
Variables Data, and explanations
Wt Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) data (Summary extract data set, 2010,
rscfp2010.dta, corresponding to data used in the Federal Reserve Bulletin).
Because the model abstract from durables and housing, wealth is defined
as financial wealth (fin).
WDCt Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF, 2010). DC account is the sum of any
households pension account except IRA/Keogh accounts included in the
financial wealth.
Ht Medical Expenditures Panel Survey (MEPS), Agency for Health Research
and Quality, 2010, RD 3/1 data. Health is defined as respondent’s self-
reported health status (RTHLTH31), and categorized by age. The original
polytomous data is converted to numerical values using a linear scale where
Poor=0.10, Fair=0.825, Good=1.55, Very good=2.275, Excellent=3.0.
P It It Medical Expenditures Panel Survey (MEPS), Agency for Health Research
and Quality, 2010, RD 3/1 data. Total health expenditures are defined as
total health care (TOTEXP11).
OOPt Medical Expenditures Panel Survey (MEPS), Agency for Health Research
and Quality, 2010, RD 3/1 data. Out-of-pocket health expenditures are
defined as total health care paid by self/family (TOTSLF11).
`t American Time Use Survey (ATUS), Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010
Activity file). Leisure is defined as the share of usual hours not worked
per week, (1-uhrsworkt/40) where codes 9999 (NIU) and 9995 (variable
hours) were set to 1.
Ct Consumer Expenditures Survey (CEX) data, Bureau of Labor Statistics
(2011 interview file). Consumption is defined as adjusted total expenditures
last quarter (totex4pq) from which we subtract health care (healthpq) and
vehicles (cartknpw+cartupq+othvehpq), with quarterly data in converted
to annual values.
Yt Current Population Survey (CPS, 2010), Bureau of Labor Statistics. The
annual income is the weekly total income times 52 weeks computed using
both full and part-time (less than 35h of work per week) households,
respectively weighted, for each age group.
wt Medical Expenditures Panel Survey (MEPS), Agency for Health Research
and Quality, 2010, RD 3/1 data. Wages are hourly wage (HRGW31X),
with inapplicable values converted to missing, and converted to an annual
basis through a 40-hours per week and 52 weeks conversion.
λm(t) Probability of dying between age t and t + 1, National Vital Statistics
Reports, Life Table for the Total US population, 2010 (Arias, 2014, Tab. 1).
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Table 5: Calibrated parameters values and sources
(a) Values
Param. Value Param. Value Param. Value Param. Value
T 100.0 κ −37.0 β 0.9656 P I0 1.8522
ψ 0.20 Π 0.0413 ΠM 0.0167 τ 0.0145
Rf 1.0408 Re 1.0709 σe 0.187 ωe 0.6
τDBf 0.014 τ
DC
f 0.05 τ
DC
w 0.06
αa 0.067 δr 7.4839 XDCmax 0.49
αPIA1 0.9 α
PIA
2 0.32 α
PIA
3 0.35
CapAIME1 0.0755 Cap
AIME
2 0.4552 PIA
max 0.2356
Wmin 0.05 Wmax 5.0 Hmin 0.1 Hmax 3.0
Cmin 0.05 Cmax 1.0 `min 0.0 `max 1.0
Imin 0.1 Imax 1.0 KZ 10
3 KQ 10
3
(b) Sources
Parameters Sources and explanations
T , κ Life tables, Arias (2014). Median age, Bureau of Labor
Statistics (2011, Tab. 2, p. 4).
β Various literature
P I0 National Center for Health Statistics (2012, Tab. 126),
CPI and annual percent change for all items, selected
items and medical care components, 2010. The Boards Of
Trustees, Federal HI and SMI Trust Funds (2012, p. 190)
ψ, Π, ΠM , τ Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (2011a,b); Medi-
care.gov (n.d.). The Boards Of Trustees, Federal HI and
SMI Trust Funds (2012, p. 190)
Rf , Re, σe Federal Reserve Bank of St-Louis (n.d.); French (n.d.)
ωe Table 2 and ICI (2014, p. 132)
τDBf Various literature, Chen and Hardy (2010), Forman
(2000), Fronstin and Helman (2013), Pang and War-
shawsky (2013)
τDCf , τ
DC
w Deloitte (2014, p. 6), Deloitte (2009, p. 12), and McIsaac
(2013, p. 5)
αa, δr Table 3 and EBSA (2013)
XDCmax IRS (2009, 2010)
αPIA1 , α
PIA
2 , α
PIA
3 , P IA
max SSA (2010, 2011)
CapAIME1 , Cap
AIME
2 SSA (2010, 2011)
33
Table 6: Estimated parameters values
Param. Value Param. Value Param. Value Param. Value
(std. err) (std. err) (std. err) (std. err)
a. Sickness and death intensities (16), (17)
λm0 0.0003 λ
m
1 3.7702 ξm 9.3898
(0.0000) (0.0087) (0.0051)
λs0 1.7193 λ
s
1 4.1696 λ
s
2 89.8946 ξs 7.0050
(0.0061) (0.0115) (0.0002) (0.0080)
b. Health production (3), (18)
δ0 0.0267 g
δ 0.0171 φ0 0.0974 g
φ 0.0269
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0001)
A0 2.1727 g
A 0.0039 ηI 0.2732 η` 0.4666
(0.0048) (0.0000) (0.0080) (0.0018)
c. Preferences (19), (20)
γ 5.1795 µc 0.0493 µ` 0.1979 ε 0.0002
(0.0167) (0.0002) (0.0060) (0.0000)
γm 2.0876 µm 0.6518
(0.0088) (0.0024)
d. Deductibles and medical prices (10), (11)
D0 0.0104 g
D 0.0059 gP 0.0063
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
34
C Figures
C.1 Optimal allocations
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Figure 1: Allocations and welfare in (W,H)
Notes: Mean of optimal allocations and welfare across levels of pension wealth, and between
ages 20–80.
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Figure 2: Allocations and welfare in (W r, H)
Notes: Mean of optimal allocations and welfare across levels of financial wealth, and between
ages 20–80.
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Figure 3: Allocations and welfare in (W,W r)
Notes: Mean of optimal allocations and welfare across levels of health, and between ages 20–80.
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C.2 Optimal life cycles
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Figure 4: Life cycle allocations
Notes: Data: solid black line (—); benchmark: solid red line (—); 95% confidence intervals:
dotted red line. Nominal values in panels d–h are reported in $100,000 units.
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C.3 Alternative model assumptions
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Figure 5: Defined benefit
Notes: The alternative is obtained by using the Defined Benefit plan outlined in Table 1. Data:
solid black line (—); benchmark: solid red line (—); alternative: solid blue line (—). Nominal
values in panels e–h are reported in $100,000 units.
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Figure 6: Low risky share
Notes: The alternative is obtained by lowering the risky share of the pension fund portfolio
ω˜ = 0.5ω. Data: solid black line (—); benchmark: solid red line (—); alternative: solid blue
line (—). Nominal values in panels e–h are reported in $100,000 units.
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Figure 7: Uninsured young agents
Notes: The alternative is obtained by removing the health insurance for young agents, while
retaining Medicare coverage after 65, i.e. ˜OOP t(It) = (1−1Rt )P It It +1Rt OOPt(It). Data: solid
black line (—); benchmark: solid red line (—); alternative: solid blue line (—). Nominal values
in panels e–h are reported in $100,000 units.
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Figure 8: Myopic health risks
Notes: The alternative is obtained by replacing predicted λˆm(Ht), by the projected, and health-
independent death intensity λ˜m = λ˜m0 + λ˜
m
1 × t, the the projection is based on a OLS estimate
using actual death intensities. Data: solid black line (—); benchmark: solid red line (—);
alternative: solid blue line (—). Nominal values in panels e–h are reported in $100,000 units.
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Abstract
US households, and more specifically homeowners, are exposed to markets risks
and crises through their housing and pension investments. They are also subject
to unemployment and health risks as they age, thus creating interactions between
health, work and assets holdings decisions over the life cycle. How do financial and
other shocks affect agents’ optimal responses? To answer, I propose a unique struc-
tural life cycle model, jointly incorporating assets holdings, time allocation, and
financial, health and real estate risks. After successfully matching the US house-
holds life cycle data, I distinctly simulate health, financial and real estate shocks
to analyze the homeowners’ optimal responses. I show that assets rebalancing and
time allocation decisions are shock-dependent.
Keywords: Health Shock, Real Estate crisis, Financial Crisis, Assets Holdings,
Wealth Shocks, Homeowners, Financial Savings, Pension Assets, Housing Wealth,
Time Allocation, Life Cycle Choices, Assets Holdings and Rebalancing.
JEL classification: D14, D91, G11, I12, J22
1 Introduction
U.S. households hold the bulk of their wealth in financial/retirement funds (17%) and
housing (64%) according to the Survey of Consumer Finance 2013, making them exposed
to financial and stock market fluctuations. During the crisis of 2007–2008, the value
of American real estate assets fell by more than 28% (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2013) and
that of US private pension assets by about 25% (Whitehouse, 2009). Such strong and
unexpected declines in wealth can be challenging for many of the agents’ future decisions.
Housing accounts for the biggest share of households wealth for two reasons mainly. First,
this is the only asset that offers direct utility services when owned. People not only get
returns but also a service providing them welfare. Second, government policies in favor of
accessing property motivate households to buy real estate assets. These latter being less
liquid than financial assets therefore tend to be kept longer. Furthermore, economic and
health risks are part of everyday life and depend on many socio-economic factors such as
age and socio-professional categories (Seeman et al., 2004). Health shocks affect health-
related choices (e.g. medical expenses), and also time allocation (e.g work hours) and
assets holdings (e.g. pension) decisions because these latter are intertwined (Hugonnier
et al., 2013). Put differently, shocks have different multidimensional repercussions on
many entwined households’ decisions. Therefore building a framework that accounts
for all variables affected by shocks is crucial to rigorously analyze the optimal life cycle
responses (e.g. policy purposes).
Through this study, I investigate how US homeowners react to some unpredictable and
negative shocks, and the differences in responses according to the types of shocks. Put
differently, the analysis focuses on the effects of shocks on households’ lifetime optimal
decisions. The adjustments made on time allocation and assets holdings are analyzed
using an extended model in which health risks are endogenous, incorporating financial,
housing and pension assets, and consumption, leisure and health-related activities, and
housing time and money investments. One of the limitations is that risky assets do
not intervene in the financial wealth process for the model to remain computationally
solvable. The model takes into account the complex interactions between health risks,
1
assets holdings and labor using a custom labor constraint. Indeed, the time endowment
is divided into four categories, i) work hours affecting both income and pension funds,
ii) healthy leisure which increases in welfare and reduces health risks (prevention), iii)
time spent on housing allowing for real estate assets accumulation (i.e. maintenance and
repairs) and welfare, and iv) healing time when a health shock happens, that reduces
the available time devoted to work, leisure and home. The model’s deep parameters are
estimated using the Simulated Moments Estimation method (Duffie and Singleton, 1993;
Keane and Wolpin, 1994). The predicted life cycles are then simulated and subjected to
financial, housing and health shocks.
Many structural life cycle papers model wealth as a share of savings invested in a
risky asset and the rest in a risk free one (Cocco et al. (2005); Gustman and Steinmeier
(2005); Chai et al. (2011b); Haan and Prowse (2014); Pelgrin and St-Amour (2016) for
examples). Notice that French (2005) distinguishes pension assets from total wealth.
Importantly, modeling wealth as a composite asset, instead of separately abstracting
from its different properties (liquidity, direct services, bequeathable components) is too
restrictive and hides specific properties. Hence, all the individual wealth components need
to be disaggregated but jointly modeled to robustly analyses the life cycles of households’
savings and the effects of serious health issues, and real estate and financial markets
downturns. Additionally, researchers dealing with housing wealth do not take into account
time as an input required for real estate wealth accumulation, but consider money as single
input (Yao and Zhang (2005); Cocco (2005); Li and Yao (2007); Iacoviello and Pavan
(2013) among others) while agents can accumulate housing wealth by investing time (e.g.
self home renovations and repairs) and/or money (e.g. cash, mortgage). Furthermore,
because time is a scarce resource, people’s time allocation choices strongly influence their
resources. However, modeling time use is not straightforward, and most models only
treat it as decisions between labor and leisure (Rust and Phelan (1997); Bloom et al.
(2003); Scholz and Seshadri (2010); Galama et al. (2013); Pelgrin and St-Amour (2016)
among others). Note that French (2005), Halliday et al. (2017), and French and Jones
(2011) explore this issue further by taking into account a healing time in their models.
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Moreover, households life cycle decisions are fully intertwined with health-related choices
(Hugonnier et al., 2013), which makes them essential when analyzing agents’ optimal
allocations. Finally, few papers study the impact of shocks on household decisions in a
complete framework. When they do (Sevak, 2002; Hurd and Rohwedder, 2010; Gustman
et al., 2010), the focus is on the effects of bad economic events on retirement. To my
knowledge, the only exception is Chai et al. (2011a) who show that the effects of financial
shocks depend on the age of individuals. However, they do not consider that crises
could affect different variables such as assets classes, and generate tailored households’
responses.
The main contribution of the paper is to provide new light on the relation between
assets holdings and time allocation decisions, especially the modeling of time spent on
housing. The time variation in investment opportunities and the fluctuation and tighten-
ing in time endowment through life is of particular interest. As people age, the probability
of getting sick increases, time becomes a scarce resource, and therefore housing renova-
tions become harder to handle. Unfortunately, computational issues stemming from the
model’s complexity made me put aside certain features such as endogenous financial risky
assets. The borrowing constraint has also some limitations and only depends on financial
wealth, instead of income. The other contributions of this paper are fourfold. First, it
completes the life cycle models of saving by jointly and realistically including the three
main assets held by US households, i.e. financial, pension and real estate ones. Second, it
adds extended time allocation decisions (labor/leisure, health, housing) to the life cycle
models of labor supply. Third, it draws from the literature about health risks through
the modeling of age-varying diversifiable morbidity shocks which affect time allocation
through two channels, prevention (leisure time) and healing (time endowment reduction).
Fourth, this paper supplements the literature on the influence of negative and unpre-
dictable events that affect households life cycle decisions by analyzing the houseowners
responses to different types of shocks.
The results are summarized as follows. First, the estimated parameters accord with
the relevant literature, data and conventional wisdoms. Secondly, I show that the model
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successfully reproduces the observed data, especially for the real estate portfolio weight,
net worth, as well as for health-related activities. The pension assets accumulation is well
matched too. Last, the simulation part identifies optimal responses to different negative
events. The simulations are based on three shocks, i.e. financial, health and real estate,
occurring when people are 45 years old, and lasting for 5 years1. I find that all shocks
decrease the agents’ net worth, especially for the housing shock (-75% at 70 years old).
Agents almost recover their net worth levels in the cases of health and financial shocks,
mainly by investing in real estate assets. Furthermore, in the three scenarios, we observe
part-time work in retirement2 to compensate for the loss of wealth. Finally, in all the three
cases, the share of housing assets in agents’ portfolio increase. Houseowners compensate
the real estate crisis by strengthening their positions in housing assets (mostly by getting
into debt). Note that they still increase pension wealth by working more.
The rest of this paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 gives the institu-
tional background, while Section 3 briefly surveys the literature about housing. Section
4 reports the model specifications. In Section 5, I introduce the numerical methods used
to solve the model, preceding the results reported in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional background
The homeownership rate peaked at 69% and the median house price increased by almost
20% from 2005 to 2007, in part fueled by US policies to promote access to homeowning.
Unfortunately, at that time, this went hand in hand with an increase in the loan size
through the creation of subprime mortgages. These latter allowed households to buy
houses with zero down payment and to benefit from a relaxed income constraint. Fur-
thermore, mortgage interest rates were variable and the securitization boomed (+300%
from 2002 to 2006 according to Chernenko et al. (2013)).
1Empirically, crises (e.g. dot-com bubble, mortgage crisis) last more than a year and less than ten,
justifying the model assumption of 5-years duration. In addition, data show that the period of life
during which agents are the most affected by negative occurrences is around 45 years old because of the
significant amount of assets and liabilities held, and the increasing health and unemployment risks faced.
2Gustman et al. (2010); Chai et al. (2011a) also found that retirement is deferred. Here, this translates
into a delayed increase in leisure time.
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The growth in homeownership was stopped by the Financial Recession of 2007-2008.
The latter stands out as the most devastating since World War II. According to the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the US consumption spending felt by almost 4%,
and importantly, investments by more than 40%, work hours by 10% and house prices
dropped by almost 30%.
The real estate crisis also affected other sectors. The contagion occurred in 2008
when the mortgage crisis affected the stock market, the latter being the second highest
household asset holding (more than 17% of households’ wealth is invested in financial
securities). Indeed the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped from a spike around 14’000
in summer 2007 to a trough around 6’500 early 2009 (i.e. 53% decrease).
In addition, the shift of retirement plans, from defined benefits to defined contributions
is also part of the story. In 1998, 50% of the retirement plan were DC-based, while in
2015, they represented3 95%. The market risks are therefore transfered from employers to
employees, the latter being more significantly affected when financial markets are down.
Finally, time allocation and endowment change over generations and over the life cycle.
People live longer and adapt their activities according to their personal characteristics
and environment. For instance, medical advances and change in policy make people
retire later. Also, the transition from manufacturing to services in the 20th century also
affected individuals’ time endowment, health and schedules. The pace and hardness of
work are different, as are the professional opportunities and the risk of unemployment.
Through the life course, time allocation evolves for different factors, health being one of
them. As people age, their probability of being sick increases and in return less time
endowment remains for other activities. However, technology mitigates this effect and
changes the opportunity cost in investing money or time in health. Around 60 years
old, the retirement decision has an important impact on people’s life. Most of the time,
households have more time for other-than-work activities but their income decreases and
they start a dissaving process, happening more and more late across generation because
of life expectancy and the shift of normal retirement age. In the last 20 years, the life
3 Source: Willis Towers Watson.
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expectancy increased by 6 years in the US4, and the average retirement age by 4 years5.
3 Housing in the literature
This paper belongs to the very broad literature of household life cycle decisions, portfolio
choice, housing, time allocation, health, and effects of shocks. This section mainly sum-
marizes interesting references about housing and macroeconomics, since the goal of this
paper is to bring together housing with other asset holdings, as well as time allocation
and health.
Illiquidity of real estate assets distinguish them from other assets and play a key role
to explain investment patterns. Kaplan and Violante (2014) show that since many house-
holds mainly hold illiquid (and costly to sell) assets (e.g. housing, pension), therefore
change in non durable consumption will depend on their liquid portion of wealth, and to
fiscal stimulus. The literature also gauges how policy affects home-owning decisions (e.g.
Maclennan et al. (1998); Jappelli and Pistaferri (2007); Saarimaa (2010)).
Closely related, Berger et al. (2017) show that real estate price movements signifi-
cantly affect consumption spending because of many factors such as the level of debt,
and housing size among others. Li and Yao (2007) also prove that house price changes
affect consumption and welfare, especially at young and old ages. Importantly, they find
that renters are worse off, while homeowners are better off in terms of net worth and
consumption. It also partly relates to papers enlightening the link between real estate
prices and consumption (e.g. Gan (2010); Iacoviello (2011); Attanasio et al. (2011)).
Speaking of housing price movements, several papers try to understand their origins
(e.g. Kiyotaki et al. (2011); Favilukis et al. (2017)). This literature strand also studies
the boom and crises. For instance, Burnside et al. (2016) develop an heterogeneous agent
model consistent with observed booms and busts. City-level housing price movements
attempt to be understood by Landvoigt et al. (2015) using data from San Diego.
The general equilibrium literature emphasizes the relation between macroeconomics
4Source: CDC.
5Source: Gallup.
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and housing (e.g. Iacoviello (2005); Leamer (2007) among others). For a review of
the literature, Leung (2004) and Piazzesi and Schneider (2016) are two key references.
The latter survey the whole domain of housing related to macroeconomics. From real
estate price evolution, to housing supply and financing, as well as asset holding and
hedging. Overall, it summarizes the housing-related hot topics. For example, a theoretical
household life cycle framework to properly model housing and its features (e.g. tenure
status, collateral constraints, transaction costs) is discussed. They also study housing
under an asset pricing perspective to compare housing and financial asset Euler equations.
Finally, very related to this paper, they review both housing and savings over the life
cycle, as well as housing as an asset class available to household portfolio choice (e.g.
Cocco (2005); Chetty et al. (2017) among others).
Many other researchers participate in the growing literature on housing modeled into
general equilibrium life cycle models. Nakajima (2005) includes housing to analyze the
link between earning inequality, asset holdings and prices. An increase in the volatility
of earnings, increases the demand of real estate assets. Again in a general equilibrium
setting, Nakajima (2010) uses an overlapping generations model to discuss the impact
of housing tax policy on capital income taxation. He finds that the effect is significant,
the capital income tax rate narrow the tax wedge between real estate and other asset
holdings.
Furthermore, there are also many papers in which partial equilibrium models have
been created to construct life cycle optimal household decisions (e.g. Cocco (2005); Yao
and Zhang (2005); Campbell and Cocco (2015) among others). For instance, Landvoigt
(2017) builds a life cycle model of housing demand to mainly find that price expectations
depend on the long-run average and that housing equity requirements are a function
of the market, i.e. tighter during bust phases. Li et al. (2016) also employ the same
methodology, i.e. a structural model of life cycle optimal choices, to study the households
wealth and housing profiles, and the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between real
estate asset holdings and consumption spending.
Finally, an ongoing research area investigates the relation between mortgage, collat-
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eral, illiquidity and foreclosure in the housing market (e.g. Chatterjee and Eyigungor
(2015); Corbae and Quintin (2015); Hedlund (2016) among others). Note that Gorea and
Midrigan (2017) focus on the liquidity constraint in the US housing market. They build
a life cycle model in which housing is an illiquid asset but agents can make their home
equity liquid through the refinancing of the mortgage.
This overview of the housing literature shows how broad and complex housing topics
are. It confirms that not much has been done to jointly model housing, health and time
allocation. It also highlights the trade off to make models tractable and solvable. In this
paper, the focus is rather on the analysis of the impact of shocks taking into account
the joint decisions between assets holding and time allocation, than on as realistic as
possible modeling of the life cycle real estate mechanisms which has already been done
very accurately by many of the previous cited references (e.g. Li and Yao (2007); Kiyotaki
et al. (2011); Attanasio et al. (2012)). In this paper, assumptions on the housing process
are made and acknowledged for computational reasons.
4 The Model
This section introduces the life cycle dynamic programming problem. In this setup, indi-
viduals face endogenous morbidity, exogenous risks on pension and real estate assets, and
have to make decisions about consumption, time and money dedicated to their property,
and (healthy) leisure. I begin by presenting the morbidity process. Then, following an
outline of the retirement system and income process, I expose the budget constraint and
the agents’ preferences.
4.1 Morbidity process
Let t ∈ (Tmin, Tmax) be the age of an agent, Tmin = 0 and Tmax = 100 is the maximum
biological longevity. The length of the life cycle is exogenous and set according to the
dataset. I define s ∈ {0, 1} as a generalized Bernoulli morbidity shock, with probability
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of occurrence conditional upon time spent on healthy leisure given by:
Pr
(
st+1 = 1|lst
)
= 1− exp [−λ(t, lst )] (1)
where λ : R+ → R++ is a function of age and healthy leisure (lst ∈ I). I denotes the unit
vector.
Agents have the possibility to reduce the likelihood of becoming ill by increasing their
time spent on healthy activities, expressed differently, they can partially hedge themselves
against the morbidity risk. However, death is fixed and assumed to be exogenous because
this feature is not crucial in this framework, and for the model to remain estimable without
facing the curse of dimensionality.
4.2 Retirement setup
Let T r and 1rt = 1t≥T r respectively define the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) and the
post-retirement age indicator. The NRA represents the age at which agents start to
receive a retirement income composed of public (i.e. social Security known as Primary
Insurance Amount, or PIA), and private (i.e. defined contribution (DC) pension scheme6)
benefits. The pension plan contributions stop at the NRA, but people can work until
death7. Therefore, the pre-retirement income is only made of labor income whereas the
post-retirement income is composed of labor income, public benefits, and private retire-
ment income. Furthermore, in a DC plan both the employer and employee contribute.
The pension account is invested in risky and risk free assets, which makes the pension
income entitlement stochastic, whereas Social Security benefits are not subject to any
investment risk.
The Primary Insurance Amount8, PIAt, is computed using an Annualized Average
6The model does not allow for defined benefit (DB) plans which is consistent with the data as a shift
from defined benefit to defined contribution plans is observed, mainly due to US government regulations
(Rajnes, 2002; Gebhardtsbauer, 2004; Ghilarducci, 2006).
7This feature enables to account for the increasing elderly labor trend observed in the data as examined
by Lim (2003), Harper and Shoffner (2004), and Schellenberg et al. (2005) among others.
8The formula is reported in Appendix A.1.
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Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) given by:
AIMEt
({ns}ts=Tmin+1) = 1t
t∑
s=Tmin+1
wsns
where ws and ns are respectively wages and working time at age s.
With W r denoting the pension fund balance and Xr the pension contributions, the
private pension income entitlement Y rt is defined as:
Y rt = 1
r
tα
rW rt , (2)
W rt+1 = [W
r
t + (1− 1rt )Xrt ]Rt, (3)
Xrt = min
{(
τwt + τ
f
t
)
wtnt, X
r
max
}
(4)
Y rt is defined by (2) as the private pension balance account (3), converted into an
annual annuity at age T r, using the annualized monthly rate αr. Furthermore, the
pension account (3) is the sum of the contributions (4) invested at Rt. The private
pension portfolio gross return Rt is made of shares ω and (1 − ω), respectively invested
in the risky Ret and risk-free R
f assets. Finally, the total contributions are given by the
sum of the age-varying employee (τwt ) and employer (τ
f
t ) contributions, and are bounded
above by Xrmax.
4.3 Income process
The participation in the labor market is modeled by the labor constraint:
nt = 1− φtst − lht − lst , lst , lht ∈ I (5)
The function φt represents the time needed to recover from a disease occurring at age t.
Among the remaining share of time, agents can decide to spend time on their housing
(lht ), and/or healthy leisure (l
s
t ). By dedicating time to their home, agents are able to
slow down the depreciation of their real estate assets, and by investing time in leisure,
they reduce their sickness risks. The rest of their time endowment is spent in work hours
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(nt).
Time in housing is important for two reasons. First, agents face time variation in
investment opportunities. They constantly have to adapt according to the variations.
For instance, high real estate assets rate of returns could motivate them to increase their
share of time spent on housing. And, they also may invest additional cash in housing.
Second, time endowment (and income) tightens as people age, mainly because of health
(and retirement) issues. Time allocation is therefore more challenging, and complex
trade-offs have to be made between investing time and/or money in the house, or even
selling it.
The total income process Yt is given by:
Yt = [1− (1− 1rt )τwt ]wtnt + 1rt (PIAt + Y rt ) (6)
The total income (6) is the sum of three stochastic sources of income, i.e. labor, social
security and pension. The workers contributions τwt are deducted from their income, and
only allowed before the NRA. Agents start to receive the Social Security and private
pension benefits from retirement on, but remain free to work without contributing to
their pension afterwards. As previously seen, although the NRA is 65, agents can still
continue to work afterwards to complement revenues. This assumption is consistent with
the data on old-age participation in labor markets (See Pelgrin and St-Amour (2016) for
specific references).
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4.4 Budget constraint
The net worth Wt is invested at the portfolio gross return R
P
t+1. The budget constraint
is therefore specified as:
Wt+1 = [Wt + Yt − Ct]RPt+1, (7)
RPt+1 = R
Hnet
t+1 ω
H
t +R
fωbt , (8)
RHnett+1 =
P ht+1
P ht
(1− δh), (9)
0 ≤ωHt ≤
1
1− αH (10)
where Ct denotes consumption expenditures, ω
H
t is the weight of total wealth invested in
real estate assets, and ωbt = 1−ωHt is the one invested in the risk-free asset9. In this setup,
agents could therefore face negative net housing assets value. This situation happens when
the housing value is inferior to the remaining mortgage balance. For instance, a crisis
(e.g. mortgage crisis in 2007) could affect the real estate market so hardly that some
agents end up with the value of their housing smaller than the mortgage amount to pay
back. To get even closer to reality, financial wealth could have been invested into some
portfolio (like the pension plan). This means an additional control variable, i.e. portfolio
share invested in the risky assets. Unfortunately, in this case, the model would have been
too complex to fight the curse of dimensionality. Equation (7) shows that wealth can be
invested in risky housing and pension assets, and risk-free financial assets. Borrowing is
possible and constrained by equation (10), in which αH is the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio.
Finally, the real estate assets value cannot be negative.
In line with the standard housing literature, real estate is modeled as a depreciable
and stochastic asset. Yet, in this framework, the depreciation rate is a function of housing
tenure h = {own, rent}. Real estate is modeled as a portfolio asset class for tractability,
which is one of the assumption and limitation of the model. Indeed, in this setup, at each
period households can adjust (sell or buy) housing units without any constraints, which
means that taxes, fees and lumpiness of housing investments are omitted (Iacoviello et al.,
9Notice that ωbt < 0 corresponds to borrowing situations.
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2007). RHnett+1 , defined in equation (9), corresponds to the net housing assets return where
P hs is the rental (h = rent) or purchase (h = own) housing price at period s, and δ
h is the
tenure status-dependent housing depreciation rate. The latter is a function of time spent
on housing for owners and corresponds to full depreciation for renters. Renting a home,
i.e. paying a rent to get a housing service flow, can be seen as investing money in real
estate that completely depreciates from one period to another. Therefore, at each time,
households have to invest again to get positive housing services. The above portfolio
notation of the budget constraint is equivalent to the standard formulation used in real
estate and urban economics (see Appendix A.2).
4.5 Preferences
Let’s define βh ∈ (0, 1) the discount factor for estimated tenure status h. The instanta-
neous utility Ut with time-separable Von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences is specified
as:
Ut = U(WHt , Ct, lst ) + βhUm(Wt,W rt ) ≥ 0 (11)
where U is positively- and Um negatively-defined monotone increasing and concave in-
stantaneous utility and bequest functions. The preferences in (11) consider the flow utility
(U) from real estate assets as a service (WHt = ω
H
t Wt), consuming, and spending time
on healthy activities. The welfare also takes into account the amount of bequest left by
agents (Um). The latter is a function of pension funds and of the net worth.
The optimization problem is the following:
V ht (Wt,W
r
t ) = max
Ct,lht ,l
s
t ,ω
H
t
Ut + βhEt
{
V ht+1(Wt+1,W
r
t+1) | Wt,W rt
}
(12)
subject to (1), (3) and (7). Importantly, V is separately solved for homeowners and
renters, meaning that the tenure status is exogenously set. In this economy, agents are
either owners or renters, with no possible transition. The two statuses are assigned
respecting the proportions of tenure types in the economy, at each age of the life cycle.
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Following standard practices in the literature, agents derive utility from real estate, but
not from financial holdings. Note that renters get utility from real estate assets, but they
cannot use them to accumulate wealth. At each period, they have to spend money to get
some housing services since renting corresponds to the particular case of full depreciation
of real estate assets. In fact, renters does not holds real estate assets in contrast to the
owners, and they pay a rental price.
5 Estimation
This section outlines the empirical strategy implemented to numerically solve, and struc-
turally estimate the model. First, I describe the functional forms. Then, after presenting
the simulated moments procedure, I focus on the Simulated Moments Estimation (SME)
method, and conclude with an overview of the data used in the estimation strategy.
5.1 Functional forms
The model specification is based on a convex housing depreciation rate, polynomial mor-
bidity intensity, convex time of recovery, as well as CES and CRRA utility functions:
δown =
δ0
1 + lh
, (13)
λ(t, ls) = λ0 + λ1t+ λ2 [l
s]−ξ , (14)
φ(t) = φ0e
φ1t, (15)
U(WH , C, ls) =
1
1− 
[
µHW
H1−γ + µCC1−γ + µlls
1−γ
] 1−
1−γ
, (16)
Um(W,W r) =
µm
1− γm (W + δ
mW r)(1−γm) (17)
The discount factor is specified as β = e−β0 . The risky asset’s log-returns ln(Ret ) and
real estate rental and purchase log-prices ln(P ht ) are normally distributed, respectively
with means µe and µ
h
p , and standard deviations σe and σ
h
p . The depreciation rate is
defined in (13) as a negative function of lh. The rate is adjusted according to the time
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that households spend maintaining or renovating their property. Because real estate can
be maintained either by investing money or time, the more time households invest, the less
value their property will loose, everything else being equal. The morbidity risk intensity
(14) is a linear function of age, and convex in healthy leisure to account for diminishing
returns. The healing function (15) is convex and age-increasing. In addition, preferences
(16) are specified as a generalized CES function to allow for different intra- and inter-
temporal elasticities of substitution (Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987). Finally, the bequest
function (17) has the same specifications as in Pelgrin and St-Amour (2016), i.e. negative
values for curvature parameter γm > 1 (dying is costly for agents) but keeping a positive
marginal value of bequeathed wealth. Notice that a share δm of pension assets, as well
as any other assets enter in the bequest. As previously explained, the bequest is made
of financial assets, i.e. risk-free and a share of pension funds, and of the net value of
financial and real estate assets; the latter being sold right after death.
5.2 The simulated moments estimation
With Θe = (Θown,Θrent) defining a set of estimated parameters10 for homeowners and
renters, Θc a set of calibrated parameters (Table 5), Mˆh (Θe,Θc) ∈ RKM the vector of
theoretical simulated life cycle moments11 for the set of variables
{
lh, ls, ωH ,W
}
and
for tenure status h, Mh ∈ RKM the empirical ones, Ω ∈ RKM×KM the optimal weighting
matrix, i.e. the inverse of the moments conditions’ covariance matrix, and αhs the observed
exogenous share of agents aged s with tenure status h in the economy, the SME formula
is given by:
Θˆe = argmin
Θe
∑
h={own,rent}
αht
[
Mˆh (Θown,Θc)−Mh
]′
Ω
[
Mˆh (Θown,Θc)−Mh
]
(18)
The estimation approach comes from the one implemented by Pelgrin and St-Amour
(2016) and is fully reported in Appendix B. In this paper, the process is more complex and
asks for distinctly solving for the two tenure statuses. Briefly, the estimation is based on
10More details can be found in Section 6.1 and Table 6.
11They correspond to the 50th percentile from 20 to 80 years old, with a 5 years increment.
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two phases. First, a backward iteration step run over the ages for the entire state space,
and separately for both tenure statuses. Second, a simulation phase follows from young
to old ages, and is based on the optimal path found in the first iterative step.
5.3 Data
Presently, there is no database containing all the information needed to estimate the
model. Therefore, based on several reliable U.S. surveys (i.e. ATUS, CE, MEPS and
SCF), I construct an aggregate set of variables, for year 2010. Following this best practice
methodology, I am aware of the fact that the model potentially replicates a cohort effect,
and not a pure life cycle effect. From the American Time Use Survey, I extract and
scale the time allocation variables, i.e. time spent on housing, health-related activities,
and work. The Survey of Consumer Finances contains data about financial, housing and
pension assets. The net worth is taken net of the retirement accounts, and the pension
wealth is made of any private retirement funds. The real estate share ωH is defined as
the ratio of housing value to net worth. Finally, the hourly wage rates are obtained from
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. A complete description is reported in Table 3.
6 Results
This section discusses the estimated parameters, followed by the iterative method results.
Then, I present the outcome obtained from the benchmark case. Finally, I introduce the
main application of the model, which is the analysis of the effects of health, financial and
real estate shocks.
6.1 Parameters
Table 6 summarizes the estimated parameters in Θe. The standard errors, reported in
parenthesis, confirm that all estimated parameters are significant at the 95% level. First,
I focus on the health-related parameters. Second, I analyze the homeowners and renters
subsets of parameters.
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Health shocks In Table 6.a, λ0, λ1 > 0 show that the health-related risks cannot be
fully hedged (Pelgrin and St-Amour, 2016), and the risk of falling sick is age-increasing
(Fries, 2002). λ2, ξ > 0 expresses the endogeneity of the morbidity risk, reduced by
increasing the share of time endowment spent on healthy activities12. Because the prob-
ability of illness is age-increasing, as people age, the positive health effect of leisure turns
out to be smaller. The positive parameters φ0 and φ1 show that recovering from a disease
is time-consuming and age-increasing. Agents do not instantaneously get healthier after
being sick, and the older the more time it takes to recover13.
Homeowners In addition, in Table 6.b, γ > 1 is consistent with the literature on
intra-temporal elasticity of substitution, and highlights the low substitutability between
consumption, housing and leisure.  > 0 confirms the non-separability and willingness to
inter-temporally substitute. Furthermore, µl > µH > µC expresses the important role of
leisure and real estate assets in agents’ welfare. The bequest parameter µm > 0 shows that
bequest motives are clearly relevant in the decision process, and the curvature parameter
γm > 1 affirms that positive bequests are costly for people, but the cost decreases as the
bequest value increases, motivating people to rationally leave bequests at death. Finally,
the time preference discount parameter β < 1 and the housing depreciation base rate
δ0 > 0 are in accordance with the literature.
Renters Renters coefficients (Table 6.c) have the same signs as the ones of houseown-
ers, except for γ. Indeed, γ = 0 makes the function linear in WH , C, and ls. Interestingly,
µrenterC > µ
owner
C saying that renters value more non durable consumption than owners.
Furthermore, βrenter < βowner tells us that renters have a bigger preference for consump-
tion today towards the one in the future compared to owners. Finally, µrenterm < µ
owner
m
is the key to the homeowners’ decision to keep their housing and any other assets at old
age, and may explain the dissaving puzzle near the end of life (De Nardi et al. (2015)).
12See Caldwell (2005), and Mannell (2007) among others.
13See Lai and Hung (2001); Messenio et al. (2013), among others.
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6.2 Benchmark: all households
Figure 1 reports the benchmark life cycle properties. Data from panels a, b, c, and d are
used in the estimation procedure. Panel e is out-of-sample.
Overall, the model fits the U.S. households life cycle data very well. By looking at
panel a, we clearly see that the model matches ωHt , the housing portfolio weight. Besides,
the time spent on real estate (panel b) is underestimated by the model before midlife, but
is recovered near the end of life. The simulated and observed time spent in health-related
activities are similar (panel c). Importantly, the net total wealth (panel d), with its
particular hump-shape, is accurately recovered. Furthermore, the out-of-sample pension
wealth process (panel e) fits well the data, except after 60, where the predictions are
too high, yet simulated values are close to the observed values. The divergence could be
explained by the model’s assumptions which abstract from partial pension withdrawal
before the NRA, whereas US law authorizes this process under restricted conditions
(Purcell, 2008).
Notice that a significant change in the optimal choices is observed around midlife. On
the one hand, the young agents optimally accumulate wealth in different forms. On the
other hand, as people age, they increase health-related activities and the wealth accumu-
lation slows down, and even stops. Last, the model successfully replicates the puzzling
fact that households keep their real estate assets longer than other assets (De Nardi et
al., 2015). It also indicates that midlife workers contribute more to their pension funds
than younger ones.
6.3 Homeowners’ optimal life cycle responses to shocks
This section analyses how householders14 change their allocations if a shock takes place.
Put differently, what is the effects of shocks on households’ lifetime optimal decisions.
I concentrate on three relevant cases which are the differences in optimal allocations
induced by health (i.e. a major illness disabling agents 50% of their time), real estate
14The following analysis only considers US homeowners since they are the only ones holding real estate
assets.
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(i.e. a negative expected return and a higher housing prices volatility) and financial (i.e.
a negative expected return and a higher risky asset volatility) shocks. We assume that
these shocks occur at 45 years old and last 5 years. The shock duration and severity are
both assumed to be completely unanticipated by the agents. After 5 years, the situation
is back to normal.
I report the settings in Table 7, and the results are disclosed in Figures 2, 3 and 4.
Health shock In Figure 2 we can see the houseowners’ optimal response to a health
shock. The optimal response is to increase real estate investments by 22% at midlife
(panel a), using leverage through a 38% increase in the proportion of real estate assets
in the portfolio(panel b), while reducing time spent on housing by 15% at the same
time (panel c). Even though agents spend a lot of time recovering, in the short run
they increase their leisure activities by 36% (panel e) to reduce the high morbidity risk
exposure at the expense of a diminishing working time. Therefore pension wealth is
negatively impacted (-24% in panel f). To compensate, they choose to work part-time
after the NRA (panel e). Overall the net worth decreases significantly at midlife (-11.5%)
but almost recovers the benchmark level at 80 years old (panel d).
Real estate shock Figure 3 exhibits the optimal response to a housing shock. This
type of shocks negatively affects the expected return and volatility of real estate assets.
First of all, unsurprisingly the weight of real estate assets in the portfolio (panel a),
as well the time spent on housing (panel c) and the net worth (panel d) substantially
decrease compared to the benchmark, respectively -70% at 75, -85% at 60 and -75% at 70
years old. However, the housing wealth declines less sharply than the net worth because
agents make positive investments in their home (panel b), increasing the proportion of
real estate assets held in the portfolio and simultaneously reducing the effect of the shock
(especially when the shock is over) by bailing out through debt and cash. Furthermore,
the health-related activities (panel e) decrease (-37% at 75 years old), sickness and work
hours augment, generating an increase in the pension wealth (+16% at the NRA) and
part-time work after the NRA (panel f). Surprisingly, homeowners do not move towards
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other financial assets, except indirectly via work hours that increase their pension wealth.
Instead they try to compensate the bad housing event by making massive real estate
investments right after the crisis is over.
Financial shock The financial shock is the unpredictable negative expected return and
high volatility of the financial risky asset. Figure 4 highlights that the benchmark results
are almost recovered near the end of life (only a 3% difference in net worth at 80 years
old). Overall, the housing wealth increases (+40% at 50 in panel a), and the net worth
and pension wealth diminish (respectively -22% at 50 in panel d and -17% at 65 years old
in panel f). Interestingly, during the first 10 years after the shock occurs, the time spent
on housing (panel c) and healthy leisure (panel e) levels are bigger than in the benchmark
case, and smaller thereafter, respectively +175% and +42% at 45, and -25% and -18%
around the NRA. US homeowners compensate the financial loss by making exceptionally
high and leveraged investments in real estate assets (panel b, +75% at midlife). Since
the pension assets are partly invested in the risky asset, their performance worsens,
therefore the agents decrease work hours and increase health-related activities to reduce
their exposure to the financial risk. Finally, they attempt to offset the loss in retirement
wealth by working more than in the benchmark case right after the shock is completely
over, postponing the age at which they retire.
Discussion Depending on the nature of the shock, the homeowner’s response is sig-
nificantly different. In the case of a real estate assets crash, effects are larger and last
longer than in a financial crash or a major illness event. Intuitively, because the share of
housing assets held by homeowners is substantial and leveraged, the real estate market
downturns have a greater impact on optimal life cycle allocations. These results prove
that agents are able to reduce the negative effects of unpredictable bad events by rebal-
ancing their assets and time allocations. In addition, in all cases the shocks generate
part-time work in retirement, in agreement with the literature (Gustman et al., 2010;
Chai et al., 2011a). I also notice that in all scenarios, the net worth is smaller. However,
homeowners almost recover their net worth levels when they face some health or financial
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shocks. This is done mainly by investing in real estate assets using debt. Finally, in all
three cases, agents rebalance their portfolio by putting more weight on real estate assets.
Even houseowners compensate the real estate crisis by strengthening their positions in
housing assets (mostly by getting into debt) at the expense of financial assets. Notice
that they still increase pension contributions through extra working time. Because real
estate assets are not only a way to easily transfer wealth in precautionary savings or
consumption smoothing purposes, but also a way to increase current welfare since they
provide a service (i.e. a home), agents compensate the decrease in welfare by investing
in housing services.
7 Conclusion
Putting together assets holdings, time allocation, and specific features such as endogenous
health, exogenous financial and housing risks in a single dynamic life cycle framework
gives promising results on the joint understanding of wealth life cycles. Foremost, the
model matches very well the U.S. households’ profiles of the real estate assets holdings,
pension wealth and net worth. Indeed, the model successfully replicates the well-known
and puzzling fact that people tend to keep their housing longer than other wealth types.
At the same time, it also recovers the hump-shaped net worth profile, and the low but
age-increasing pension fund accumulation pattern which lasts until the age of retirement.
Most importantly, the model’s ability to reproduce life cycle patterns makes it useful
for policy purposes. By simulating health, real estate and financial shocks distinctly,
the model allows to compute the US homeowners’ optimal responses to different unpre-
dictable or unexpected bad events. The simulations highlight that all three shocks have
significant effects on the owners’ decisions throughout their lives. Unsurprisingly, they
decrease the net worth and postpone the full retirement age, but in different magnitudes.
Additionally, the life cycle impact is bigger when the real estate market collapses. Indeed,
a crisis on housing assets has stronger effects on the US homeowners’ net worth, assets
rebalancing and optimal time allocation decisions than one affecting financial assets15 or
15The magnitude of the 2007 subprime crisis confirms this outcome.
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one hitting health. The consequent impact is to blame for the low homeowners’ portfolio
diversification around 45 years old. Indeed, houseowners’ wealth is mainly composed of
real estate assets. Furthermore, comparing health and wealth shocks is very interest-
ing because on one hand, the former constrains time allocation choices by cutting time
endowment, but assets holdings have the same characteristics as before the shock. On
the other hand, wealth shocks change the characteristics of the assets held, but leave
completely unconstrained time allocation decisions.
Overall, the model proves that owners should optimally and rationally adjust their life
cycle choices to minimize the negative effects of unexpected declines in health, pension,
housing, savings, or other valuable assets. It is also worth to mention that the results
presented depend on the assumption that the optimal allocations levels are achievable,
which may not always be the case. For instance, in a period of economic crisis, the labor
demand is usually low, making the rise of working time difficult for workers. Moreover,
paying for end-of-life nursing home and long term care using real estate assets would
have been a relevant households’ choice to model. When agents sell their private home to
finance a nursing home, they do not have to make the tradeoff between investing money
or time in their home any more. Their time allocation and asset holdings therefore could
improve the fit of the model. Other alternatives such as renting the house, or contracting
a reverse mortgage are also possible and interesting, but out of the scope of the paper.
Note that the model is tractable in the sense that different shocks can be simulated at
the same time. Further analysis could allow for some degree of anticipation, with agents
having expectations on the likelihood and amplitude of these shocks. An alternative
could also include a coexistence between informed and uninformed agents. Finally, in this
framework, I abstracted from medical expenses even though they are crucial for weakly
health insured agents. Adding them for further research could complete the study.
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A Model Implementation Formulas
A.1 The Primary Insurance Amount (PIA)
The Social Security formula is defined as:
PIAt = min
{
αPIA1 min
(
AIMEt, Cap
AIME
1
)
+
αPIA2 max
[
0,min
(
AIMEt − CapAIME1 , CapAIME2 − CapAIME1
)]
+
αPIA3 max
(
0, AIMEt − CapAIME2
)
, P IAmax
}
A.2 The Budget Constraint
The setup presented in this paper remains equivalent to the standard one used in the
housing literature. The proof is derived from the standard budget constraint (BC) as
follows:
P ht Ht+1 + qtbt+1 + ct − yt ≤ (1− δh)P ht Ht + bt
≤ P
h
t
P ht−1
(1− δh)P ht−1Ht + qt−1bt
1
qt−1
Vt + ct − yt ≤ RHnett P ht−1Ht +Rfqt−1bt = Wt = Vt−1RPt (19)
where P ht is housing price for tenure status h at time t, Ht is the number of housing units
hold or rent, qt bond price, bt bond units held or sold, ct the consumption, yt the income,
Vt = W
H
t +W
b
t and R
Hnet
t =
Pht
Pht−1
(1− δh).
Then, from (19):
Wt+1
RPt+1
+ ct − yt ≤ Wt
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Hence, the BC can be written as a law of motion of the net total wealth invested in
portfolio P :
Wt+1 ≤ [Wt − ct + yt]RPt
where RPt+1 =
Wt+1
Vt
= RHnett+1
WHt
Vt
+Rf
W bt
Vt
= RHnett+1 ω
H
t +R
f (1− ωHt )
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B Estimation Methods
B.1 Iterative step
Using the notation of Pelgrin and St-Amour (2016), let Z = (W,W r) ∈ Z specify
the discretized state space of dimension KZ , 
s ∈ {0, 1} the health shock, and Q =
(C, lh, ls, ωH) ∈ Q the discretized control space of dimension KQ. The dimensions of
both spaces, as well as the minimum and maximum values for the state and control
variables, are summarized in Table 4.
The iterative step is run separately for the two housing tenure statuses. It consists of
numerically solving the model (12) by backward induction, via a Value Function Iteration
(VFI) approach from age Tmax to Tmin:
V ht (Zt) = max{Qht ∈Q}
U(Qt, Zt) + βEt
{
V ht+1(Zt+1) | Zt
}
s.t. Zt+1 = Zt+1(Qt, Zt, 
s
t+1, R
e
t+1, R
P
t+1), ∀ Zt = Z ∈ Z
(20)
For all state space points and for h = {own, rent}, the optimal controls and welfare
are computed, and later used in the simulation phase. The optimal solution set can be
expressed as:
{Qht (Z), V ht (Z)}Tmaxt=Tmin , ∀Z ∈ Z, h ∈ {own, rent} (21)
B.2 Simulation step
To find the optimal life cycle path, I simulate KI agents for each of the two tenure
statuses and run KN Monte-Carlo replications using together the optimal allocations
(21), the health shock process (1), and the laws of motion (3) and (7). The simulation is
performed for individuals aged Tmin and over as follows:
1. The first state, for agent i of type h in simulation n, is initialized by randomly
drawing from the observed population financial wealth level at age Tmin, and by
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setting pension wealth to its minimum value:
W h,i,nTmin ∼ WDATA, W rTmin = W rmin
2. Then, from t > Tmin to t = Tmax:
• The optimal rules Qh,i,nt and value function V h,i,nt are evaluated at the state
Zh,i,nt by running a spline interpolation of the policy functions (21), previously
linearly interpolated in the iterative process.
• The morbidity shock is endogenously drawn from the generalized Bernoulli
distribution:
s,h,i,nt+1 ∼ {0, 1}|λ(Qh,i,nt )
• The risky asset returns and housing prices processes are generated by log-
normal-distributed random variables as follows:
Re,nt+1 ∼ Log −N (µe, σe), P nt+1 ∼ Log −N (µp, σp)
• The state variables are updated:
Zh,i,nt+1 = Zt+1(Q
h,i,n
t , Z
h,i,n
t , 
s,i,n
t+1 , R
e,n
t+1, P
n
t+1)
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C Tables
Table 1: Asset Allocation and percentage share invested in equities for DC plans
Equity % in 401(k) Age 20’s Age 60’s Average
0 0.09 0.16
(0,20] 0.01 0.08
(20,40] 0.02 0.14
(40,60] 0.05 0.26
(60,80] 0.19 0.16
(80,100] 0.64 0.20
Average 0.74 0.48 ω = 0.6
Notes: Equities include equity funds, company stock, and the equity portion of balanced fund.
Funds include mutual funds, bank collective trusts, life insurance separate accounts, and any
pooled investment product invested primarily in the security indicated. Source: Tabulations
from EBRI/ICI Participant-Directed Retirement Plan Data Collection Project. See ICI Re-
search Perspective, ”401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, Account Balances, and Loan Activity in
2012”.
Table 2: Joint Survivor Annuity for a $100’000 investment in 2010-2011
100% Joint Survivor Monthly Annuity for $100’000 invested
Age 01.01.2010 01.07.2010 01.01.2011 01.07.2011 Average
65 494 480 481 465 480
70 538 524 526 508 524
75 596 580 596 566 584.5
80 684 668 675 649 669
50% Joint Survivor Monthly Annuity for $100’000 invested
Age 01.01.2010 01.07.2010 01.01.2011 01.07.2011 Average
65 575 559 555 538 556.75
70 643 627 623 609 625.5
75 734 717 713 699 715.75
80 870 851 846 829 849
δm = 0.5 and αr = 556.75×12
100000
= 0.06681
Notes: Source: www.immediateannuities.com/annuity-shopper/as-archive.html
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Table 3: Data sources
Variable Database (2010) Description
WHt SCF
(file: rscfp2010.dta,
var: houses)
Housing wealth is defined as the mar-
ket value of the primary residence.
Wt SCF
(file: rscfp2010.dta,
var: networth-retqliq)
Net worthcorresponds to the net total
wealth, assets minus debt, except the
one concerning retirement.
αownt SCF
(file: rscfp2010.dta,
var: hhouses)
It is equal to the share of homeowners
in the economy at age t.
W rt SCF
(file: rscfp2010.dta,
var: retqliq)
Pension wealth is equal to the funds
accumulated for retirement purpose.
lht ATUS
(file: atussum 2010.dat,
var: t02xxxx+t09xxxx)
Time spent on housing is defined as
the share of time (in hours) when
agents undertake interior/exterior
cleaning, arrangement, decoration,
building and repairing. Then, scaled
in a way that the total time spent on
housing, health, recovery and work is
equal to 1.
lst ATUS
(file: atussum 2010.dat,
var: t01xxxx+t08xxxx
+t12xxxx + t13xxxx)
Time spent on healthy leisure activi-
ties and illness recovery is defined as
the scaled time when people practice
mental or physical activities consid-
ered as good for health (e.g. sleep-
ing, relaxing, listening to music, bik-
ing, running...), or when they receive
healthcare services (e.g. going to the
doctor, to hospital...).
wt MEPS
(file: h142.dat,
var: hrlywage)
Wages are hourly wages converted to
an annual basis through a 40-hours
per week and 52 weeks conversion.
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Table 4: State and control spaces settings
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Wmin 0.001 Wmax 2.5
W rmin 0.00 W
r
max 0.45
Cmin 0.00 Cmax 0.45
lhmin 0.00 l
h
max 0.17
lsmin 0.40 l
s
max 1.00
ωHmin 0.00 ω
H
max 4.5
KZ 15
2 KQ 15
4
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Table 5: Calibrated parameters values, descriptions and sources
Parameter Description Value Source
Tmin Minimum age 15.000 Data surveys.
Tmax Maximum biological age 100.00 Life tables, (Arias, 2014).
T r Normal retirement age (NRA) 65.000 U.S Social Security Ad-
min.
Rf Risky free asset gross return 1.0408 Federal Reserve Bank of
St-Louis.
µe Risky asset log-return mean 0.0790 S&P500 return 2010-
2014.
σe Risky asset log-return volatility 0.1870 S&P500, volatility 2010-
2014.
ω Risky asset share 0.6000 Table 1 and ICI (2014).
µownp Purchase log-return mean 0.0493 St.Louis FED, House
Price Index for the
United States.
σownp Purchase log-returns volatility 0.059 St.Louis FED, House
Price Index for the
United States.
µrentp Rent log-return mean 0.0302 St.Louis FED, Rent of
primary residence 2010-
2014.
σownp Rent log-returns volatility 0.0156 St.Louis FED, Rent of
primary residence 2010-
2014.
τwt Employee contribution rate 0.05e
0.02t−1 Literature on DC/401(k)
contribution rates.
τ ft Employer match rate τ
w
t Rule of dollar-for-dollar.
δm % of the joint annuity bequest 0.5000 Table 2, EBSA (2013) and
Hersh (2010).
Xrmax Max. DC/401(k) contribution 0.1650 IRS (2009, 2010).
αPIA1 PIA formula’s parameter 1 0.9000 SSA (2010, 2011).
αPIA2 PIA formula’s parameter 2 0.3200 SSA (2010, 2011).
αPIA3 PIA formula’s parameter 3 0.1500 SSA (2010, 2011).
CapAIME1 Annualized AIME Cap 1 0.0900 SSA (2010, 2011).
CapAIME2 Annualized AIME Cap 2 0.5462 SSA (2010, 2011).
PIAmax Max. Social Security benefits 0.2827 SSA (2010, 2011).
αr Annualized annuity rate 0.0668 Table 2.
δrent Renter depreciation rate 1 Assumption of the model.
αH Loan-to-value ratio 0.8 Literature on mortgages.
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Table 6: Estimated parameters values and standard errors
Parameter Value
(Std. err.)
Parameter Value
(Std. err.)
a. Health shocks
λ0 1.3003
(0.0503)
λ1 0.1019
(0.0021)
λ2 0.9003
(0.0546)
ξ 1.4004
(0.0408)
φ0 0.0500
(0.0009)
φ1 0.0058
(0.0004)
b. Homeowner
γ 3.0056
(0.0778)
 0.5289
(0.0101)
γm 3.2197
(0.0848)
µm 9.4466
(0.1963)
µH 1.1003
(0.0523)
µC 0.0801
(0.0007)
µl 1.5206
(0.0466)
β0 0.0645
(0.0016)
δ0 0.0248
(0.0009)
c. Renter
γ 0.0000
(0.0001)
 0.5289
(0.0101)
γm 3.6750
(0.0879)
µm 0.0005
(0.0000)
µH 1.3300
(0.0381)
µC 0.2025
(0.0092)
µl 1.3002
(0.0315)
β0 0.1501
(0.0033)
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Table 7: Shocks parameters
Parameter Value Parameter Value
a. Health
φ0 0.3894
b. Housing
µp −0.0702 σp 0.2398
c. Financial
µe −0.079 σe 0.374
Notes: For initial parameters values, see Table 5 and 6.
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D Figures
D.1 Benchmark
20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0
0.5
1
1.5
a. Housing portfolio weight
20 30 40 50 60 70 80
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
b. Housing time investment
20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0
1
2
c. Net worth
20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
d. Health-related activities
20 30 40 50 60 70 80
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
e. Pension wealth
Figure 1: Life cycle simulated and observed allocations and statuses
Notes: Data: solid black line ( ); benchmark: solid red line ( ); 95% confidence interval:
dotted red lines ( ).
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D.2 Life Cycle Effects of Shocks
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Figure 2: Effects of health shocks on the homeowners’ life cycle allocations
Notes: Life cycle (LC) percent variations implied by a 5-years health (He) shock happening at
45 years old (LC
He−shock−LCbench
LCbench
).
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Figure 3: Effects of housing shocks on the homeowners’ life cycle allocations
Notes: Life cycle (LC) percent variations implied by a 5-years housing (Ho) shock happening
at 45 years old (LC
Ho−shock−LCbench
LCbench
).
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Figure 4: Effects of financial shocks on the homeowners’ life cycle allocations
Notes: Life cycle (LC) percent variations implied by a 5-years financial (F) shock happening at
45 years old (LC
F−shock−LCbench
LCbench
).
43
Effects of Financial Literacy on Financial Inclusion:
Evidence from Pakistan∗
Yannis Mesquida1
1Faculty of Business and Economics (HEC), University of Lausanne
December 25, 2018
∗I thank Pascal St-Amour for his very helpful advices. I am thankful to Ouarda Merrouche and the
World Bank for providing me the data on the access to finance of Pakistani households. Finally, useful
comments from Marius Bru¨lhart, Rafael Lalive, Ju¨rgen Maurer, Pierre-Carl Michaud, Joa˜o Montez,
Jean-Paul Renne, Dominic Rohner and Mathias Thoenig are acknowledged.
Abstract
Literature has shown that financial inclusion is beneficial for welfare. Despite
the attempts to develop the formal financial sector, Pakistan still faces a high formal
financial exclusion (Global Findex - World Bank). This paper examines the impacts
of conventional (i.e. man-made law) and Islamic (i.e. Sharia rules) financial litera-
cies on the Pakistani households participation in the formal and informal financial
sectors. It uses a non recursive simultaneous equations probit model based on the
2015 Access to Finance - Pakistan survey (Horus – Gallup Pakistan). Overall, I
find that the conventional financial literacy positively and strongly affects the use
of formal financial services, while the Islamic financial literacy has a weaker positive
impact. Moreover, both types of financial knowledge decrease the participation in
the informal market, especially when it comes to the Islamic financial proficiency. I
conclude that financial literacy programs such as the Nationwide Financial Literacy
Program (NFLP) could be relevant to reduce financial exclusion.
Keywords: Financial Inclusion, Conventional and Islamic Financial Literacy, For-
mal and Informal Financial Services, Feedback Effects, Non Recursive Simultaneous
Equations Probit Model.
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1 Introduction
The effects of financial development on economic growth has been widely studied in
literature (Patrick (1966); Demetriades and Hussein (1996); Hassan et al. (2011) among
others). Access to formal finance1, and more precisely financial inclusion (i.e. access to
and use of formal financial services), has been proven beneficial for households welfare
(Burgess and Pande (2005); Tita and Aziakpono (2017)) and firms growth (Rahaman
(2011); Adomako et al. (2016) among others). Indeed, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Singer (2017)
state that financial inclusion affects intra- and inter-temporal spending and financial
choices, and therefore makes it easier for agents to transfer resources through time, to
smooth-out consumption levels, hedge against financial, income, or health shocks, and
increases the likelihood of investing in education and business. Households also benefit
from being formally financially included because formal products have a higher efficiency
(smaller cost and higher speed), a better safety (lower risk of theft and default) and more
transparency (existence of official records) relative to informal services.
These benefits justify the intervention of the World Bank and Consultative Group to
Assist the Poor (CGAP) to improve the welfare of agents by promoting formal financial
inclusion in developing countries. To provide measurement, they develop financial inclu-
sion indicators (Access, 2009; Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Klapper, 2012). Other international
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations
(UN) also fight against financial exclusion2. They develop different solutions to promote
and improve the use of financial services such as advising financial services providers and
policy makers.
The level of financial literacy is closely linked to financial inclusion and welfare. Ac-
cording to Mandell (2006), financial literacy is defined as ”what people must know in
order to make important financial decisions in their own best interest”. Agents with
1Ledgerwood (1998) defines formal financial institutions as organisms that ”are chartered by the
government and are subject to banking regulations and supervision.”.
2According to Sinclair (2001), financial exclusion is ”the inability to access necessary financial services
in an appropriate form. Exclusion can come about as a result of problems with access, conditions, prices,
marketing or self-exclusion in response to negative experiences or perceptions.”. See also (Claessens et
al., 2009).
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poor financial knowledge are less likely to make optimal financial choices (Hilgert et al.,
2003; Lusardi, 2008) because of poor money management skills, and might even achieve
overwhelming debt situations that increase their likelihood of being financially excluded
in future decisions.
Despite remaining a poor and rural country, Pakistan has progressed with respect to
financial inclusion. For instance, in the 1960s as in India, many banking branches were
opened, to reach more than 3000 branches in the 1970s, period in which banks became
national, leading to very inefficient services in the next years. At this time, the informal
finance strengthened because it was the only one serving rural area and non wealthy
households. Banks were privatized in the 1990s, contrary to India for instance, and the
State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) was seen as the only banking regulator. However, as of
today, banks still face high rates of non performing assets. Recently, the US embassy as-
sessed the Pakistani banking system and concluded that a major transition is happening,
with new formal market players, and a financial development occurring at the household
level. Branchless banking, ATM and mobile money are at the center of the SBP’s policy.
As reference, Ahmad et al. (2010) detailedly reviewed the historical background of the
banking/financial sector in Pakistan, from independence to nowadays.
The context of Pakistan is particular because it is a Muslim country, in which reli-
gion potentially affects agents’ financial decisions (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al., 2014). While
the supplies of traditional, micro and mobile3 financial services have been developing
in the past years, the rate of financial exclusion remains high. With only 14% of Pak-
istani households using formal financial services4, and with an index of financial inclusion
(IFI5) equal to 0.109 in 2010, Pakistan belongs to the lowest formally financially-included
countries in the world. Various reasons are mentioned by Pakistanis for the opening of
bank accounts. Above all, they open accounts to receive money from employers or from
personal businesses (61.44%) and to save money (33.73%). However, bottlenecks are nu-
merous and mainly indicative of self-exclusion reasons. First, 44% of households declare
3Financial services that are provided through mobile phones.
4Source: 2015 Pakistan Access to Finance survey.
5See Sarma et al. (2008).
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a lack of knowledge about banks and 35% about bank accounts. In addition, about 25%
say that an account would not bring them any advantages and 17.7% think that they do
not have enough money to open one. Other possible reasons are the eligibility criteria
such as providing necessary papers to open an account or the collateral constraint to get
a loan.
Unsurprisingly, theses rates of low financial literacy and high financial exclusion go
hand in hand with an informal financial sector6 coexisting with the formal one. The
data show that a high proportion of households (around 58%) use informal services in
the economy. These transactions are hardly monitored since there are no official records.
Because of this coexistence, the study is challenging if both types are to be jointly mod-
eled. One of the main interactions highlighted by literature is the crowding out effect
(McKernan et al., 2005). The latter occurs when an increase in the access to formal
(informal) finance decreases the use of informal (formal) financial services. Therefore, in
such a context, a household-level survey on the joint demand for both formal and informal
financial services is essential to assess consumer financing choices.
Moreover, conventional and Islamic banking are two very different financial systems.
While the former is man-based law and profit-oriented, the latter is based on the Is-
lamic law (Shariah). Since the 1950s, the Islamic religion has rules to regulate finance
(Ala Maudoodi, 1979), stating that any financial transaction has to be Shariah compli-
ant, i.e. in accordance with the Islamic law. This means respecting some rules such
as the prohibition of paying/receiving interest, the control of the industry in which the
investment is made (e.g. alcohol businesses are forbidden), and finally the split of profits
and losses between lenders (i.e. stakeholders) and borrowers (i.e. clients). Among the
mechanisms used, there are mainly i) Mousharaka, ii) Mourabaha, iii) Ijara, iv) Sukuk
and v) Istisna. They are respectively equivalent to a situation in which i) the money
lender is a shareholder, ii) the financial institution buys the goods and directly sells it
to the client with a premium, iii) the good is rented, iv) a bond with fixed and risk-free
interest, and v) a customer signs a construction contract for a pre-determined amount
6In Pakistan, available financial services can be either formal (e.g. checking account, (micro-) credit)
or informal (e.g. cash stored at home, cash advances from retailers).
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of money. However, some researchers and philosophers complain about these products
by stating that they are just disguised conventional finance instruments. On the other
hand, under the conventional finance legislation, money is a product that gives interest
and there is limited risk sharing between banks stock and deposit holders. Their ways of
working and being used involve different knowledge and beliefs. Distinguishing the two
is important, especially in a strong Muslim context such as Pakistan.
My objective is to evaluate the effects of conventional and Islamic financial literacies on
the use of both formal and informal financial instruments. I achieve this by building a non-
recursive simultaneous equations model with endogenous dummy variables. It includes all
participation in the formal and informal financial services (e.g. checking/savings accounts,
micro-credit, Islamic finance products, cash held at home, cash advances from retailers,
family/friends loans and others) merged in two distinct groups, i.e formal and informal.
I estimate it using the method of Full-Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML). The
model relies on unique data from the 2015 Access to Finance - Pakistan survey. This
survey is composed of data on access to finance for Pakistani households, especially their
use of financial services. It was conducted in early 2015 on more than ten thousand
households across the four provinces of Pakistan (Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,
Punjab and Sindh). Hence, it gives a unique opportunity to analyze the relation between
different categories of financial literacies (conventional and Islamic) and different types
of financial inclusion (formal and informal).
This study relates to two axes of literature. First, it contributes to the identification
of the effects of financial literacy on households financial behaviors by distinguishing
conventional from Islamic financial knowledge, and by endogenizing financial decisions.
Second, it assesses the effects of literacies not only on the formal financial inclusion but
also on the informal financial sector participation through feedback effects modeling.
Hence, the framework avoids potential simultaneity biases, permits indirect effects and
common shocks, and questions the relevance of financial literacy programs.
The main results are the following. First of all, the model validates the hypothesis
that levels of financial literacy positively impact the formal financial inclusion of Pakistani
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households, although the Islamic financial literacy has a weaker effect than the conven-
tional one7. Furthermore, Islamic financial literacy negatively affects the likelihood of
Pakistani households to use informal financial products. The effect is particularly strong,
implying that Islamic banking may be a good substitute for the informal financial sec-
tor, in particular if Pakistanis share the belief that the informal sector does not respect
Islamic finance principles. Finally, these results tend to confirm that financial literacy
programs such as the one run by the State Bank of Pakistan (NFLP) are relevant in
a formal financial inclusion policy trying to intervene on the demand side of financial
markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 respectively provide
a literature review and an overview of the data used in the analysis. Section 4 presents
the model specification and the estimation method. The empirical findings are reported
in section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
The effects of accessing finance on income and the importance of formal financial inclusion
for growth and households welfare8 have been widely studied. Improving access usually
reduces income inequality, and poverty in general (King and Levine (1993); Gine´ and
Townsend (2004); Beck et al. (2007); Beck and Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt (2008); Bauer et al. (2016);
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Singer (2017) among others). In addition to income, some studies
focus on consumer spending. For instance, Seck et al. (2017) highlight that access to
finance participates in the increase in Nigerian households’ consumption. Conversely,
accessing credit does not improve households consumption smoothing in Ghana (Annim
et al., 2011). Interestingly, Cole et al. (2011) show that bank accounts and formal credits
are used more often when households consumption levels are higher, both in India and
Indonesia. Allen et al. (2016) emphasize that financial inclusion reduces banking costs
7The exogeneity assumption of financial literacy unfortunately limitates the strength of the model
because of the lack of good enough instruments to run an IV estimation. Therefore talking about
causality is delicate. This is further discussed in Section 4 and 6
8To obtain policy-oriented details, you can refer to the review on access to finance written by Claessens
(2006).
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and makes the political environment more stable, among other findings. However, none
takes into account that financial services and consumption might have some feedback
effects mitigating a strong unilateral causality relation, and causing endogeneity through
a simultaneity bias.
It is not only traditional banking that improves people’s well-being, microfinance and
mobile money accounts have also strongly helped in the last two decades, especially in
developing countries. It has also been shown that microcredit contributes to poverty
reduction (Khandker, 2005). Yet, researchers debate about its effects on consumption
and welfare. While Mahjabeen (2008) finds that microfinance institutions increase income
and consumption levels, Morduch et al. (1998) show that households eligible to borrow
through a microfinance program do not consume more than others. Actually, the main
criticism is about the targeted population and eligibility of microcredit programs. Scully
(2004) and Simanowitz (2002) depict how extremely underprivileged poor people are left
aside from the programs. As in traditional finance, Ciravegna (2005) highlights self-
exclusion issues. It is also worth to mention that microfinance can play an insurance role
by mitigating the negative effect of health shocks on consumption and income (Islam and
Maitra, 2012). For more details, Brau and Woller (2004) and Hermes and Lensink (2011)
review articles about microfinance. Moreover, Donovan (2012) analyses the benefits of
deploying mobile money solutions, and Must and Ludewig (2010) show how mobile money
can reduce poverty. In many countries this technology has grown, notably in Kenya (Jack
and Suri, 2011). The advantages of mobile bank accounts over traditional ones are mainly
the reduction of infrastructure costs, ease of implementation (wired vs. antenna), access
and only owning a mobile phone as eligibility criteria.
The literature on the supply side of financial services is well developed and found
several key variables that drive supply (Levine, 2005). However, on the demand side de-
terminants are not well understood, making it an active research area. Economists have
proved that many individual characteristics affect household financial behaviors (Hono-
han and King (2012); Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Klapper (2013); Funga´cˇova´ and Weill (2015)
among others). These individual characteristics condition agents’ eligibility (e.g. col-
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lateral constraint) and self-exclusion (e.g. beliefs). More precisely, Ca´mara and Tuesta
(2015) use a quantitative approach on Peruvian data to show that individual character-
istics such as gender, age or types of human settlement matter for financial inclusion.
Wachira and Kihiu (2012) exhibit that Kenyan households’ access to finance is a function
of age, education, income, gender, distance from banks, marital status and other personal
attributes. Some studies focus on the credit instruments (Diagne, 1999; Barslund and
Tarp, 2008) and remittances. Ambrosius and Cuecuecha (2016) find positive effects of
remittances on different formal savings and borrowing using household-level data from
Mexico. As for Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al. (2014), they demonstrate that Muslims are less
likely to own a formal account than non-Muslims, although this conclusion does not hold
with respect to formal or informal borrowing. Although these are useful contributions
for policy purposes, the simultaneity biases could arise from joint spending and use of
financial instruments decisions, or between formal, informal or both types of financial ser-
vices. An attempt was made by Bendig et al. (2009) who estimate a multivariate probit
model with three formal services on household survey data from Ghana. They reveal that
wealth positively determines the households likelihood of using formal financial services
and that the participation depends not only on socio-economic characteristics but also
on household’s potential risks and exposure to past shocks. However, they do not include
spending and informal financial decisions in the estimation procedure.
Financial literacy has extensively been studied, especially its effects on households
financial behaviors. Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) review theoretical works which include
financial literacy as a certain type of human capital investment, and empirical studies
assessing the effects of financial literacy on consumer behaviors. This literature shows that
financial knowledge has a positive effect on households’ participation in financial markets
(e.g. Cole and Shastry (2008); Van Rooij et al. (2011)), diversification (Gaudecker, 2015),
individual saving and borrowing (e.g. Lusardi (2008); Jonubi and Abad (2013); Doi et
al. (2014); Jamison et al. (2014); Brockman and Michayluk (2015)), retirement planning
(Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007b, 2009, 2011). Furthermore, Klapper et al. (2013) prove
that households financial market participation increases with financial literacy. On the
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other hand, some papers argue that financial literacy is not a strong determinant of
financial inclusion (Wachira and Kihiu, 2012; Lyons et al., 2017). Finally, very few papers
examine financial literacy in Pakistan. As example, Ghaffar and Sharif (2016) highlight
that Pakistani households with financial knowledge tend to save more money than the
financially illiterate ones.
A non negligible literature strand concentrates on formal and informal financial ser-
vices. Klapper et al. (2013) emphasize that financial knowledge decreases the use of
informal financial services. A major effort has been made to understand the mechanisms
linking formal and informal financial services, more particularly on the understanding
of the crowding out effect (Morduch (1999); McKernan et al. (2005) among others). In
addition, Carpenter and Jensen (2002) investigate the use of formal and informal saving
instruments in Pakistan to find that even poor and rural households use conventional
banking to some extent, and that policies should focus on literacy and numeracy pro-
grams. Guirkinger (2008) and Madestam (2014) study the coexistence of formal and
informal credits. They respectively find that the informal sector is used by any type
of household, and that the degree of substitution between formal and informal loans de-
pends on the bargaining power of banks. However, they abstract from non-credit financial
services, such as checking/savings accounts9.
3 Data
In this section, I describe the data source and show some descriptive statistics. Then, I
provide more details about the relevant variables used to estimate the model.
3.1 The survey
The data come from the unique survey named Access to Finance Study Pakistan - Ques-
tionnaire. This survey was conducted in early 2015 jointly by Horus Consulting and
9Note that Collins (2005); Ellis et al. (2011); Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Klapper (2012) document the use
of any formal/financial instruments, respectively in South Africa, Kenya and in 148 countries. However,
these papers are limited to descriptive analyses.
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Gallup Pakistan for the State Bank of Pakistan, and is based on more than ten thousand
households interviewed across the four provinces of Pakistan (Baluchistan, Sindh, Pun-
jab, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). One objective is to provide information to Pakistani
banks about Pakistani households’ use and satisfaction with financial services. Because
more than 30% of the Pakistani households are totally financially excluded, and only
around 15% use any formal financial services, the State Bank has two goals. First it
seeks to gauge the evolution of the access to finance during the last years, and second
to achieve a deeper understanding of the factors explaining the low demand for financial
services, especially when other countries nearby have substantially higher demand for
formal services10. The survey description tells us that the aim is to improve financial
inclusion to boost economic growth and households’ income. The survey mainly contains
information about households’ financial literacy, bank and mobile account owners and
non-owners, expenses, borrowings and savings, remittances and income. The method-
ology of the sample design is well established and the sample is representative with an
error margin of 1% at the 95% confidence interval level. The sample quality is ensured
by the use of standard survey statistical procedures, interviewer trainings, and control of
data collection and entry.
3.2 General descriptive statistics
The questionnaire has the conventional socio-economic and demographic descriptions
about the respondents and households characteristics such as age, gender, type of living
area, province, marital status, education, occupation, and living conditions. Table 10
reports the main statistics. The average respondent age is 36 years old, the female-
male ratio equals 0.7241, 67.07% live in rural areas, 85.9% are married. While 95.97%
have an easy access to drinking water infrastructure, 61.02% own a refrigerator, 65.70%
a mobile phone, 72.89% a motorized vehicle and 88% a TV. Notice that about 30% of
households are composed of large family units, with more than 9 individuals. In addition,
we learn that less than 7% of respondents have a high level of education (i.e. at least
10For instance, according to Gallup, by 2008, only 1% of Pakistanis use micro credit, while 35% of the
population use it in Bangladesh and 25% in India.
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graduated from college). Only about 1% hold an insurance contract, while 37.94% report
being exposed to job/business, 26.12% health, 23.81% thief and 14.08% destruction risks.
Furthermore, 4.83% already faced a food shock in the last 12 months, and 5.35% about
utility bills. Remittances rates are equal to 4.25% for sending and 3.1% for receiving
money.
Figure 1 exhibits the access to finance by occupation. Housewives, unskilled workers
and students are the least formally included and the most financially excluded overall,
whereas high skilled workers, farmers and retired people are the most formally financially
included. Shop and business owners with unskilled workers as well, belong to the least
financially excluded categories, and are the most informally financially included.
Finally, Figure 3 provides information on the categories of expenditures. More than
94% of the respondents declare daily life spending, 50.51% for education and 18.17%
for health expenditures. 96.64% had at least one of the three types of expenses in the
last 12 months, and 66.16% had either education, health or both. Besides, 27.32% of
households acknowledge to have both daily life and health expenses, 17.62% when it
comes to education and daily life, and less than 4% when it is about incurring education
and health.
3.3 Key Variables
The survey highlights that cash payments are prevalent in Pakistan, the main savings
method is by keeping cash at home, borrowing is not widespread, and that the retailers
are the main credit providers. Importantly, Figure 2 shows that about 15% of individuals
are formally financially included (variable IF ), 58% are informally included (variable II),
and 33% are totally excluded from the use of financial services. The types of financial
services are constructed using the survey questions reported in Tables 5, 7 and 8. The
households possession of any accounts, savings and borrowing are categorized to get the
formal (e.g. bank accounts, bank loans) and informal (e.g. family and friends loans, cash
advances from shopkeepers) financial types (Appendix A). Furthermore, formal financial
services are used sparingly. According to the questionnaire, about 88% of households do
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not have any traditional checking or saving bank accounts, and about 96% do not have
any formal borrowings. Only 3.69% of households hold formal loans, while 14.84% have
informal ones. Importantly, half of the respondents use informal ways to save money.
Another important section of the survey is the one about financial literacy, from
which is learnt that while 23% of Pakistani households have both low financial and Is-
lamic finance literacy, only 2.28% have high ones. Table 2 shows variables FINLIT
and ISL FINLIT , standing respectively for conventional and Islamic financial litera-
cies. Most of the respondents have a medium conventional financial knowledge (more
than 71%) whereas less than 5% have a high one. 68.7% do not have awareness of Islamic
finance and 7.8% know a lot about it. The two variables are constructed using a specific
question (Table 9) about the knowledge of conventional (e.g. ATM, credit card) and
Islamic (e.g. Takaful, Mudaraba) financial-related words. The measures are proxies for
financial literacies, with scores based on the subjective answers of households (Appendix
A). Conventional financial literacy is low for score above 28, medium if the score is be-
tween 12 and 27 and high if below 13. Islamic financial literacy is constructed in the
same way but with different thresholds (respectively 9, 6 and 10, and 7). Notice that
even if this survey is unique, some questions unfortunately remain too basic to obtain
the highest robustness. For instance, literacies are based on personal opinion and not on
an objective examination. Therefore, an over confidence problem affecting households’
answers may exist.
Table 3 gives a correlation matrix between the two types of literacies and the two
categories of financial services. The literacies and services are positively correlated, es-
pecially with formal financial inclusion (0.1953 and 0.1715 respectively for financial and
Islamic financial knowledge). The correlation coefficients of the informal sector are close
to zero. Finally, a crowding out effect is apparent between formal and informal services
since their correlation coefficient is negative (-0.1427).
This descriptive analysis confirms the Pakistani households’ financial exclusion, espe-
cially from the formal services, and motivates to question the impact of financial literacy
on households participation in financial markets, i.e. financial inclusion, while caring
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about the feedback effects between the types of financial services. Indeed, non null corre-
lation coefficients from Table 3 encourage to formally test the relation between financial
literacies and services. To provide a further analysis, I use statistical inference methods
presented in the next section.
Additional information about the data construction can be found in Appendix A and
Tables 5 to 9.
4 Empirical modelling framework
This section discusses the econometric model specification, identification and estimation
procedure. I construct a simultaneous multivariate probit11, composed of the two cat-
egories of financial services (i.e. formal and informal). The framework is based on the
general model of Nelson and Olson (1978). It allows for non recursion between multi-
ple structural equations and respects the logical consistency condition without requir-
ing constraints on coefficients of the endogenous variables12. Only exclusion restrictions
characterizing SEM-type models are imposed and reported in Appendix B. The estima-
tion procedure is based on the standard Full-Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML)
method.
4.1 The model
4.1.1 Structural form
Let’s define Yl = {IF , II} observed dependent dichotomous variables and Y ∗l the corre-
sponding latent variables with IF , II being formal and informal financial services. Let
also µ be a zero vector of dimension L× 1, and Σ a L× L covariance matrix of variance
1 and covariance terms ρjk. The simultaneous L-equations probit model can be written
11See Heckman (1978), Nelson and Olson (1978) and Amemiya (1978) among others.
12Nelson and Olson (1978) proved that by using the latent form of the endogenous variables in the
right-hand side, no constraints are required on endogenous variables coefficients.
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as:
Y
∗
nl = XnBl +
L∑
i=1
i 6=l
Y
∗
niαil + FINLIT n × βFINl + ISL FINLIT n × βISLl + εnl (1)
Ynl =

1, if Y
∗
nl > 0
0, otherwise.
(2)
where n = {1, ..., N}, l = {1, ..., L}, ε = (ε1, ..., εL) | X ∼ N (µ,Σ) is a random multivari-
ate Gaussian process of mean µ and covariance Σ, Xn is the 1 by K vector of exogenous
variables, FINLIT n and ISL FINLIT n are exogenous conventional and Islamic finan-
cial literacies with associated coefficients βFINl and β
ISL
l . The exogeneity assumption
could be problematic. For instance, households may have access to banking learning pro-
grams after opening a bank account. Therefore being financially included may increase
the probability of being financially educated. Indeed, one of the limitations of the model
is that we unfortunately do not have access to good instruments to run robust IV esti-
mations. This would have helped to solve the potential reverse causality. Many papers
also struggle with the potential endogeneity of financial literacy and try to use some
instruments (e.g. Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a); Fornero and Monticone (2011)). The
instruments they refer to are unfortunately not available or good enough for this paper13.
Also notice that they all are analyzing developed countries, while the story could be dif-
ferent in Pakistan, a developing Muslim country. To address the endogeneity of literacy,
a Durbin-Wu-Hausman’s test was performed and did not reject the null hypothesis of
exogeneity of both conventional and Islamic financial literacies. Finally, Bl and αil are
respectively a K-vector and a scalar of unknown parameters associated to equation l.
Interestingly, in (1), the endogenous dependent variables also appear in the right-hand
side, corresponding to the non recursion feature of the model and allowing to avoid the
simultaneity bias. Because a crowding out effect might occur between the two finan-
13For instance, education level, distance to bank, use of computers have been tried without success.
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cial sectors, their relations must be modeled by taking into account the two-way causal
relationship to prevent the potential endogeneity induced by simultaneity biases. The co-
efficients αil inform about the crowding out effects between the types of financial services
IF and II .
In addition, the model permits autocorrelation between error terms, i.e. non-zero error
covariances. Empirically, this feature is reflected in common causes of the residual terms.
Correlated errors between formal and informal financial services could be a liquidity crisis
or the result of an interest rates policy. The ones between the types of consumption may
depict a global rationing on goods and services.
4.1.2 Restricted reduced form
The restricted reduced form corresponding to the econometric model (1) can be written
in the following matrix notation:
Y
∗
= XBA−1 + FINLIT × βFINA−1 + ISL FINLIT × βISLA−1 + εA−1 (3)
where Y ∗ is a N × L matrix, X a N × K matrix of observed exogenous variables, A
and B respectively L × L non singular and K × L matrices of unknown parameters.
FINLIT and ISL FINLIT are two N × 1 matrices associated to the two 1×L vectors
of parameters βFIN and βISL to estimate.
4.2 Estimation
The non recursive system of probit equations is estimated using the Full-Information Max-
imum Likelihood method (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1995). This estimation is challeng-
ing because all the observed endogenous variables are categorical. The system is therefore
multivariate probit and does not have an analytical solution. In addition, it accounts for
the simultaneity between the latent variables, and the correlation between error terms
across equations, making the system non recursive.
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The log-likelihood to maximize is therefore given by:
lnL
(
Γ, Σ˜;Y | X˜
)
=
N∑
n=1
ωn ln ΦL
[
qn ◦ X˜nΓ; Σ˜
]
(4)
where ΦL is the L-dimensional multivariate normal distribution with mean µ and co-
variance matrix Σ˜ = A
′−1ΣA−1, X˜ = [X FINLIT ISL FINLIT ] is a N × (K + 2)
matrix, ωn is an exogenous observation weight, Γ = B˜A
−1 the matrix of unknown co-
efficients in the reduced form model where B˜ =
[
B′ βFIN
′
βISL
′]′
is a (K + 2) × L
matrix, and qn = 2Yn − 1 a 1× L vector.
During the estimation process, I experimented with various optimization algorithm
and also controlled for many variables (e.g. age, education gender, income, remittances)
to make the results as accurate as possible, while ensuring that order, and necessary and
sufficient rank conditions specific to SEM models are met. A complete description of the
control variables is given in Appendix C.
5 Empirical results
I report the estimated marginal effects and robust standard errors in Section 5. Table
11 reports the independent probit in Column (1) and the SEM probit allowing feedback
effects between financial sectors in Column (2). I firstly analyze the effects of the con-
ventional financial literacy on financial inclusion. Then, I focus on the impacts of the
Islamic financial literacy on households participation into financial markets.
5.1 Marginal effect of conventional financial knowledge on fi-
nancial inclusion
In this section, I investigate how the conventional financial literacy, i.e. the degree of
knowledge of formal financial services, affects the probability that Pakistani households
use formal and/or informal financial services after controlling for many other variables.
Two different approaches are used and presented below, with the second one correcting
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major flaws of the first model.
By looking at specification (1) in Table 11, we observe that higher levels of conven-
tional financial literacy significantly increases the probability that Pakistani households
use formal financial services at the 0.001 significance level. From low to medium liter-
acy, the probability of using formal instruments increases by 9.8%, and from low to high
knowledge the increase equals 16.64%. However, the effect is not significant with respect
to informal services. These first observations suggest that by investing in conventional
financial literacy programs, households’ likelihood to use formal services will increase.
However, this specification might have three weaknesses. First, there are no feedback ef-
fects between the formal and informal use of financial services, meaning that the potential
crowding out effect between the two financial sectors is not modeled and might lead to
biased estimates. Second, households spending is treated as exogenous variables whereas
there could exists two-way relations between the spending and financial decisions. Third,
the disturbance terms are not correlated. This is a strong and potentially unrealistic
assumption since the two financial sectors might be affected by common shocks.
The SEM specification (2) is the most complete and preferred model. It improves
the independent probit model by taking into account the feedback effects between formal
and informal financial services, and by adding correlation between the error terms. This
model also rejects the null hypothesis that the conventional financial literacy does not
influence the households participation in the formal sector at the 0.001 level. It reveals
that households with an average financial literacy have 10% more chance to use the
formal financial services compared with low financially literate ones. This probability
increases to 16.66% when we look at the high financial literacy agents. Again, the effects
of financial literacy on the use of informal tools are not significant. Yet, the estimated
coefficients (for medium and high literacy) are both negative.
Hence, improving the conventional financial understanding of Pakistani households
makes them more likely to use the formal financial services and barely to give up the
informal sector, even after controlling for the feedback effects between the two financial
sectors.
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5.2 Marginal impacts of Islamic financial literacy on Pakistani
households participation in financial sectors
In this section, I concentrate on the effects of Islamic financial literacy on the likelihood
that households use formal and informal financial products.
From Column (1) in Table 11, we see that the effects of being averagely and highly
Islamic financially literate on the probability of using formal instruments are both positive
and significant, respectively 1.88% at the 1% level and 9.25% at the 0.1% level. However,
the change in likelihood for the informal products is not rejected only for the higher level
of Islamic financial literacy. Indeed, households with a high Islamic financial literacy are
15.31% less likely to use the informal sector, in contrast to low level agents.
In the second model reported in Table 11, Column (2), the null hypotheses that the
medium and high Islamic financial knowledge do not influence the use of formal financial
services are rejected, respectively at 5% and 0.1%. The probability of participating to the
formal sector increases by 1.85% for households with a medium literacy and by 11.43% for
those with a high knowledge compared with low Islamic financially literate households.
As for the null hypotheses regarding the informal services, they are not rejected. Yet, the
marginal effect coefficient associated to the high Islamic financial literacy is negative.
5.3 Robustness checks
As robustness check, I tested a specification where an interaction term between the two
types of literacies is added to model (1) and (3). This term captures the potential inter-
action between conventional and Islamic knowledge.The effects of conventional financial
knowledge have the same sign and significance level on the use of formal (0.1018∗∗∗ vs.
0.0994∗∗∗ and 0.1702∗∗∗ vs. 0.1612∗∗∗) and informal financial tools (-0.0423∗∗ vs. -0.0726∗
and -0.0268 vs -0.1188). If we look at the effect of being Islamic financially educated
on formal financial inclusion, again coefficients are close and mostly remain in the same
significance thresholds to the ones previously found (0.0174∗ vs. 0.0139 and 0.1116∗∗∗
vs. 0.1013∗∗). The story is similar when we analyze the effect on the informal inclusion
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(0.0123 vs. -0.0477 and -0.1782∗∗∗ vs. -0.2996∗∗∗). Note that the effect of Islamic finance
proficiency on households’ use of informal financial instruments is substantially bigger
when interactions between literacies are taken into account. To sum up, incorporating
the interaction term strengthens and does not contradicts the initial results.
In addition, as second robustness check, endogenous consumer spending have been
added to the SEM specification. The methodology and estimation results are reported
in Appendix F. This check is based on the theory predicting that households do not just
make choices on the use of financial services, but they also jointly decide the types and
quantities of goods and services that they consume (e.g. from consumption to education,
and going through health expenses) (Morduch, 1995; Menon, 2004). Interestingly, these
choices intertwine, and consumption-smoothing across time, states and types of goods
is made possible through optimal choices of financial instruments in a complete-market
setting. Access to finance may limit consumption levels and consumer spending deter-
mines the demand for financial services and vice versa. To take into account the bilateral
effects between spending and financial decisions may produce more robust and unbiased
analyses. This theory is reinforced by the correlation matrix between financial services
(i.e. formal and informal), and consumer spending (i.e. daily life and education-health)
reported in Table 4. Daily life expenses are positively correlated with both types of
financial services, and financial services are negatively correlated between each other.
The correlation between informal services and education-health expenses is also positive,
while the one with formal services is negative but close to zero. Therefore it seems that
financial inclusion and consumer spending have a positive linear relationship, especially
for the informal inclusion. The SEM specification reported in Table 12 incorporates feed-
back effects between the two types of financial services, considers correlation between
errors and endogenizes households spending with the use of financial services, making
them simultaneous choices. Overall, even after controlling for many micro determinants
and simultaneity biases, the model confirms that the conventional financial literacy still
positively affects the households likelihood to use formal financial services in Pakistan.
Having a medium conventional financial knowledge increases by 10.18% the probability
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that households use instruments from the formal financial sector, and by 17.02% when
they have high literacy compared to low literate agents at the 0.1% level. Interestingly,
the hypothesis that having an average knowledge about conventional finance does not
have any impact on the use of informal financial services is rejected at the 1% level. In-
deed, having a medium literacy decreases the probability that households employ informal
financial instruments by 4.23%. Furthermore, it confirms and concludes that increasing
the proficiency of households in Islamic finance positively impacts their likelihood to use
the formal financial services, and negatively the informal ones. For instance, highly Is-
lamic financially literate households are 11.16% more likely to use the formal financial
sector, and 17.82% less likely to use the informal sector in comparison to low Islamic
financially literate agents. At the average level of Islamic financial knowledge, effects are
weaker, and even insignificant for the one related to the informal sector.
Assuming that households with a high conventional financial knowledge naturally use
the formal conventional services, and the one with a high Islamic financial literacy use
the formal Islamic tools, we can suppose that the formal conventional finance is not re-
lated to the informal sector, and that the formal Islamic finance may be a substitute
to the informal financial services. Alternatively, we can argue that the Pakistani infor-
mal financial sector offers products that are not Sharia-compliant, and are not targeting
highly Islamic financial literate households, but rather those who are more literate in
conventional finance.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies the mechanisms affecting the formal financial exclusion observed in
Pakistan. Despite the fact that the supply side is well developed, the demand from Pak-
istani households for the formal financial sector is very low. The case is particular because
a strong informal financial market coexists with the formal sector and many agents self-
exclude for various reasons. Because financial literacy levels are direct variables that the
Pakistani Government could use to improve financial inclusion, it is therefore interesting
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and challenging to assess whether or not the financial literacy of households influences
their financial inclusion, after controlling for all other potential micro determinants.
This paper has presented a non recursive simultaneous equations model with binary
endogenous variables. It contributes to literature in two ways. First, by taking into
account of feedback effects between the formal and informal financial services, and by
allowing for correlated errors, the model produces more accurate results than standard
independent probit models. Second, the analysis distinguishes the effects of conventional
financial literacy from the Islamic one. This is important since Pakistan is a Muslim
country and people’s financial decisions can be influenced by religion (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et
al., 2014).
The findings can be summarized in three main points. First, I show that both types of
financial literacy positively affect the formal financial inclusion, the latter being beneficial
to households’ welfare (e.g. Burgess and Pande (2005); Tita and Aziakpono (2017)).
Second, I highlight that the conventional financial literacy has stronger effects on the
use of financial instruments than the Islamic financial knowledge. Third, the Islamic
financial literacy decreases the likelihood to use the informal financial services more than
the conventional one. These results could mean that Islamic banking is a substitute for the
informal financial sector, whereas conventional banking seems unrelated. Alternatively,
it could mean that because informal products are not based on the Islamic law (e.g. no
interest rates paid or received, sustainable activities funding, material finality behind
transactions), highly Islamic finance-skilled households, being aware of it, switch to the
formal Shariah-compliant services.
On the policy side, this study confirms that financial literacy programs could enhance
households participation in the formal financial sector. Depending on the desired out-
come, these programs could either strengthen the formal financial inclusion, or strengthen
it while reducing the use of informal services. They should be conventional or Islamic
finance-oriented.
However, despite the complexity of the model, which takes into account several feed-
back effects, conventional and Islamic financial literacies are assumed to be exogenous.
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It is therefore difficult to talk about causality between financial literacy and financial in-
clusion since the estimation could potentially be plagued by endogeneity. Talking about
correlations is more conservative but would be more reasonable in this analysis.
Furthermore, it is worth to mention that the model is based on endogenous categorical
variables. One built on continuous data would have been preferable. Unfortunately, the
data are not available to run such a study on Pakistan. Nonetheless, this paper can
be seen as a good starting point for further analyses. Note that because the model is
computationally demanding, a trade-off has to be made between the convergence speed
and the number of endogenous variables. Indeed, the more types of spending and financial
services are added, the harder the convergence becomes. Getting multi-country data could
be an axis of future research, like comparing the magnitudes of impact in developed and
developing countries for instance.
Last, another promising line of research is the study of the impact of mobile money
literacy on Pakistani households financial inclusion. Indeed, in the next years, more data
will be available on the use of this technology, currently seen as a very good and effective
solution to formal financial exclusion in developing countries like for instance in Kenya.
A longitudinal study on the evaluation of long-term effects of mobile money on financial
inclusion and welfare would be promising.
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A Endogenous variables and literacies construction
Observed endogenous variables defining the use of financial services are constructed using
variables from the questionnaire. The questions asked are therefore about having any
formal accounts, savings methods and forms of borrowing (see Tables 5, 7 and 8). Here
is how I recoded the information:
• IF = 1 (formal services), if q301 X = {1, ...12} or q701 X = {1, ...23}, zero other-
wise; where q701 X = 1
• II = 1 (informal services), if q601 X = 18 or q701 X = {24, ...36}, zero otherwise;
Finally, conventional and Islamic financial literacies variables (see Table 9) are con-
structed in the following way:
• FINLIT equals 1 if the financial literacy score is above 28 (low literacy), 2 if above
12 and below 29 (medium literacy), 3 if below 13 (high literacy). The financial
literacy score being the sum of the binary variables q202 {a,b,c,e,f,g,i,j,m,n,o,p}
which represent whether or not respondents never heard about (+3), heard but
do not understand (+2), or heard and understand (+1) bank, interest, fixed term
deposit, loan, savings, debit card, ATM, bank fees,credit card, cheque, exchange
rate and mortgage.
• ISL FINLIT equals 1 if the Islamic financial literacy score is above 9 (low liter-
acy), 2 if above 6 and below 10 (medium literacy), 3 if below 7 (high literacy). The
financial literacy score is the sum of the dichotomous variables q202 {d,h,l,q}, re-
spectively for the knowledge of Islamic banking, Takaful, Mudaraba, Musharakah.
Variables are coded 3 if respondents never heard about, 2 if heard about but do not
understand, or 1 if heard about and understand.
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B Coherency and identification
As proved in Nelson and Olson (1978), because the endogenous variables only appear in
their latent form in the right-hand side of the structural equation (1), no constraints on
endogenous variable parameters are required. This model specification naturally implies
logical consistency, i.e. coherency, with A being invertible and defined as:
A =
 1 γ12
γ21 1

However, the standard problem of identification associated to any simultaneous equa-
tion model needs to be solved. According to the theory (e.g. Davidson and MacKinnon
(1995), Gujarati (2009)), the L-simultaneous equations are identified if the order and
rank conditions are met. B ensures identification using exclusion restrictions14 and is
specified as the following constrained matrix:
B
′
=

b11 b12 0 0 b15 b16 b17 b18 b19 b110 b111 b112 b113 b114 b115 b116 b117 b118 b119 b120 b121
b21 b22 b23 0 b25 b26 b27 b28 b29 b210 b211 0 b213 b214 b215 0 b217 b218 b219 b220 b221
b31 b32 b33 b34 b35 b36 b37 b38 b39 b310 b311 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b41 b42 0 b44 b45 b46 b47 b48 b49 b410 b411 b412 b413 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

where blk corresponds to the unknown parameter associated to the observed exogenous
variable k in equation l. Appendix C reports details about observed exogenous regressors
and their correspondence to the blk coefficients.
14The restrictions are in line with economic theory.
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C Control variables
Table 1: Control variables description
Variable Description (survey-related variable)
age (b·1) Age of the respondent (q1302).
gender (b·2) Sex of the respondent, 1 if female, zero otherwise (q1301).
popbyareaproj (b·3) It refers to the projected population by tehsils, for year 2015 (it
is based on Pakistan 1998 (last) Census and annualized popu-
lation growth rates (by tehsils) from 1951 to 1998)
children (b·4) Number of children younger than 13 years old in the household
(q1310).
income (b·5) It defines the income of the respondent, equals low if below
10000, medium if between 10000 and 21000, high if bigger
(q1005).
married (b·6) Marital status of the respondent, equals 1 if married, 0 otherwise
(q1303).
moneysent (b·7) They are dichotomous variables: 1 if the respondent sent money
in Pakistan/abroad, at least once, in the last 12 months, zero
otherwise (q801s).
moneyreceived (b·8) They are also dichotomous variables: 1 if the respondent re-
ceived money from Pakistan/abroad, at least once, in the last
12 months, zero otherwise (q801r).
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education (b·9) It equals low if the respondent does not have formal education
(cannot read), or if no formal education (can read) or primary
education (not complete (NC)); medium if primary education
(complete(C)) or matriculation (NC), or if matriculation (C)
or intermediate (NC) , or if intermediate (C) or some diploma;
high if diploma (C) or some college/uni, or if university degree
(C) or post-grad (q1304).
province (b·10) It refers to the living province of the respondent: 1 for Punjab,
2 for sindh, 3 for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 4 for Balochistan (aa1).
work sector (b·11) It corresponds to the working sector of the respondent and
equals 1 if “farmer”, 2 if unskilled sector (“public or health
service worker“, or “farm worker”, or “cleaner/house help”, or
“watchman”, or “driver”), 3 if low skills sector (”messenger”, or
”conductor”, or ”salesperson in a store”, or ”manual labor, un-
specified profession”, or ”factory employee”, or ”waiter/cook”),
4 if high skills sector (“professional, i.e., doctor, teacher. . . ”,
or “manager”, or “clerk”, or “secretary”, or “policeman”), 5 if
craftperson sector (“carpenter/mason”, or “mechanic”, or “elec-
trician”, or “tailor”, or “salonist”), 6 if “shop owner”, or “busi-
ness owner”, or “money lender”, 7 if “street vendor/hawker”,
8 if others such as “retired”, “student”, “housewife”, “land-
lord/landlady” or anything else (q1305).
urban (b·12) Households type of living area, equals 1 if urban, zero otherwise
(aa6).
hhsize (b·13) Number of persons in the household, small if below 5, medium
if between 5 and 9, high if above (q1309).
shocks (b·14) In the last 12 month, did you have a situation where you had
not enough money to buy/pay? 1 for food, 2 for bills (q403).
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risks (b·14) Which dramatic events do you think are the most likely to hap-
pen to people around you? 1 for thief, 2 for health, 3 for de-
struction, 4 for job/business failure (q410).
relocate (b·16) It equals 1 if the household moved at least once in the past 12
months, zero otherwise (q1306).
banksbyheadproj (b·17) Number of banks per individual (using population projections
and data from bank websites).
banksdensity (b·18) Density of bank by tehsil (using data from bank websites) .
motor (b·19) Does the household own a motorized vehicle? 1 if yes, zero
otherwise (q1318).
phone (b·20) Does the respondent own a mobile phone? 1 if yes, zero other-
wise (q1319).
tv (b·21) Does the household own a TV? 1 if yes, zero otherwise (q1317).
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D Figures
Figure 1: Formal and informal financial inclusion rates by respondents’ occupation
Source: http://www.a2f2015.com
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Figure 2: Histograms of Pakistani households’ financial inclusion, savings and borrowing
by formal and informal types
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Figure 3: Histogram of Pakistani households’ spending by categories
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E Tables
FINLIT / ISL FINLIT Low Medium High Total
Low 23% 0.59% 0.01% 23.60%
Medium 44.18% 21.90% 5.51% 71.59%
High 1.52% 1.01% 2.28% 4.81%
Total 68.7% 23.5% 7.8% 100%
Table 2: Sample distribution by conventional and Islamic finance literacy
FINLIT ISL FINLIT IF II
FINLIT 1
ISL FINLIT 0.3927 1
IF 0.1953 0.1715 1
II 0.0220 0.0127 -0.1427 1
Table 3: Correlation table between literacies and financial services
CD CE IF II
CD 1
CE 0.1585 1
IF 0.0457 -0.0017 1
II 0.0753 0.0874 -0.1427 1
Table 4: Correlation table between financial services and consumer spending
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Question Answer Code
q301: Do you have
any of the following
accounts in your own
names?
Current account/checking account 1
Savings account / PLS Savings Account 2
Basic Banking Account 3
Foreign Currency account 4
National Savings Centre Account 5
Post Office Savings Account 6
Islamic Current Account 7
Islamic Foreign Currency Account 8
Islamic Saving Account / PLS Savings Account 9
Islamic Term Deposit Account 10
Fixed term deposit account 11
Account used to get assistance money from the Gov. 12
No, I do not have an account in my own names 99
Table 5: Survey question about households’ accounts (2015 Access to Finance survey)
Question Answer Code
q1012: Can you
please tell me, which
were the three items
for which you spent
the largest part of
your household
money during the
past 12 months, from
in this list below?
Education 1
Food 2
Rent 3
Transport 4
Clothing 5
Mobile phone 6
Other communications 7
Utility bill 8
Taxes 9
Health 10
Ceremonies 11
Donations 12
Leisure 13
Unexpected, exceptional event 14
Table 6: Household spending survey question (2015 Access to Finance survey)
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Question Answer Code
q601: As we said
before, there are
many different ways
to put something
aside for future
expenses. Now, I
would like you to tell
me which of the
following forms of
savings you have at
the moment when we
speak.
Banks 1
Islamic bank 2
Microfinance bank 3
Pakistan Postal Savings Bank 4
Money on a Mobile account 5
Money on a National Savings Account 6
Money in Government savings certificates 7
Money in a Mudaraba certificate 8
Money in a Government’s pension scheme 9
Money on a Pensioners’ Benefit Account 10
Money in a Provident Fund 11
Money in bonds/shares traded in the stock market 12
Money in a Life Insurance 13
Money in an endowment/Investment saving plan 14
Money in an Education Plan 15
Prize Bonds 16
I contribute to a Committee 17
Money put aside at home 18
Silver/gold/jewels 19
Foodstuff 20
Animals 21
Stocks of agriculture products 22
Stocks of agriculture inputs 23
Land/property 24
Animals belonging to the landlord 25
Money entrusted to friends/relatives 26
Money entrusted to business partners 27
I expect to get help from friends in case of emergency 28
I have no savings at the present moment 98
Table 7: Survey question related to households’ savings (2015 Access to Finance survey)
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Question Answer Code
q701: I am now going
to read a list of
possible forms of
borrowing. First
borrowing money to
purchase things for
yourself or for your
household or for your
business or for the
activity with which
you earn money; then
borrowing by
receiving goods that
you did not have to
pay for immediately.
Please, tell me which
of these you have
currently. I mean any
borrowing you made
and that you still
have to pay back or
are in the process of
paying back at this
moment when we
speak.
Credit ceiling granted by your bank to be used with your credit card 1
Overdraft facility granted by your bank 2
Advance against salary from a bank 3
Facility granted by a bank for Hajj/Umrah expenses 4
Short term personal loan from a bank or other organization 5
Personal loan from a bank to finance household equipment 6
Islamic loan 7
Household appliance lease from a bank, a leasing companies or a retailer 8
Microlease from a leasing company or a microfinance 9
Loan or lease to finance vehicles 10
Loan to finance property/housing 11
Microloan from a microfinance bank or an NGO or another organization 12
Group loan 13
Loan to start a business 14
Business loan to finance working capital 15
Business loan to finance equipment 16
Business vehicle lease 17
Business equipment / plant / machinery lease 18
Microloan for business 19
Microlease for business 20
Agriculture loan from a bank 21
Education loan 22
Advance received from employer against salary 23
Loan received from employer 24
Money borrowed from a money lender 25
Cash advance from a shopkeeper 26
Credit received from the landlord 27
Peshgi 28
Money from friends or relatives (payback) 29
Money from friends or relatives (no payback) 30
Borrowing from a committee in which you are a member 31
Borrowing from an association in which you are a member 32
Cash advance from retailers or wholesalers 33
Cash advance from business partners or landlord 34
Goods received on credit from shopkeeper or retailers 37
Goods received from an association or another organization 38
Goods received from relatives or friends 39
Goods received from the landlord 40
Goods or material received on credit from retailers or wholesalers 41
Chit or parchi system 42
Agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizer, etc.) 43
No current loan or credit facility 98
Table 8: Households borrowing question (2015 Access to Finance survey)
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Question Answer
q202: I am going to
read out some words,
please tell me
whether: you have
heard of the word and
understand its
meaning (1); you have
heard the word but
do not understand
what it means (2); or
you have never heard
of the word (3).
Bank
Interest
Fixed term deposit
Islamic banking
Loan
Savings
Debit card
Takaful
ATM
Bank services fees
Insurance
Mudaraba
Credit card
Cheque
Exchange rate
Mortgage
Musharakah
Mobile money
Table 9: Question about households’ financial knowledge (2015 Access to Finance sur-
vey)
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Mean Standard Deviation
Demographics
Age 36 (10.78)
Female/male ratio 72.41% (0.4938)
Married 85.9% (0.3480)
Children 85.19% (0.3552)
Living in Urban 32.93% (0.4700)
Relocation 2.26% (0.1485)
Household size
5 > 11.60% (0.3203)
10 > · > 4 58.21% (0.4932)
> 9 30.19% (0.4590)
Education
Low 38.97% (0.4877)
Middle 54.27% (0.4982)
High 6.76% (0.2511)
Income
Low 24.56% (0.2135)
Middle 40.73% (0.4913)
High 34.71% (0.4761)
Province
Balochistan 16% (0.3593)
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 28% (0.4521)
Punjab 37% (0.4814)
Sindh 19% (0.3928)
Living conditions
Easy water access 95.97% (0.1967)
Fridge 61.02% (0.4877)
Phone 65.70% (0.4747)
Motor 72.89% (0.4445)
TV 88% (0.3250)
Remittances and insurance
Remittances sent 4.25% (0.2017)
Remit. received 3.1% (0.1735)
Insurance 0.99% (0.0991)
Risks
Thief 23.81% (0.4260)
Health 26.12% (0.4393)
Destruction 14.08% (0.3478)
Job/Business 37.94% (0.4853)
Shocks
Food 4.83% (0.2143)
Utility 5.35% (0.2251)
Table 10: Households summary statistics
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Table 11: Estimated marginal effects and robust standard errors of the independent
probit (1) and non recursive multivariate probit models (2).
(1) (2)
IF II IF II
FINLIT
Mid 0.0980∗∗∗ -0.0181 0.1000∗∗∗ -0.0194
(0.0073) (0.0133) (0.0104) (0.0345)
High 0.1664∗∗∗ 0.0187 0.1666∗∗∗ -0.0103
(0.0191) (0.0265) (0.0203) (0.0212)
ISLFINLIT
Mid 0.0188∗∗ 0.0130 0.0185∗ 0.0038
(0.0073) (0.0119) (0.0073) (0.0089)
High 0.0925∗∗∗ -0.1531∗∗∗ 0.1143∗∗∗ -0.0821
(0.0145) (0.0206) (0.0156) (0.1456)
Feedback IF -II No Yes
Correlated errors No Yes
Endo. consumpt. No No
Control variables Yes Yes
Observations 10590 10590 10590
R2 0.33195 0.0907 0.1669
Log-likelihood 2971.33 6545.60 9614.27
The baseline corresponds to low conventional and Islamic financial literacies.
Results associated to the control variables are available upon request.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 - Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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F SEM with endogenous consumption
The spending categories, C(s), are based on non-exclusive categorical variables. The
interviewers asked the biggest three expenditures the respondents had during the past 12
months (see Table 6). The construction of variables is as follows:
• CD = 1 (daily life: food, rent, utilities) if q1012 X = {2, 4, 5, 8}, zero otherwise.
• CE = 1 (education: school/university + health: doctor, hospital) if q1012 X =
{1, 10}, zero otherwise;
The estimation is based on the model presented in Section 4, except that here Yl =
{IF , II , CD, CE}
In the simultaneous L-equation probit model, the coefficients αil inform about the
crowding out effects between the types of financial services IF and II , the nature of
goods (i.e. complements or substitutes) for spending categories CD and CE, and the
intra-temporal relation between consumption and financial decisions.
Note that the corresponding latent variables C∗ may be negative. Indeed, C∗ should
be interpreted as excess demand over and above home production; a negative C∗ would
then indicate surplus of production over needs (e.g. for agricultural products). Similarly,
households with a certain education level or with some health services skills (e.g. baba,
pir, sufi) may provide services to other households. In these cases, households consume
their own consumption goods or services, and do not need to buy from external sources.
Correlated errors between financial services and consumption might represent an in-
stitution that does not accept to finance some consumption categories.
In the reduced form, the invertible matrix A is defined as A =

1 γ12 γ13 γ14
γ21 1 γ23 γ24
γ31 γ32 1 γ34
γ41 γ42 γ43 1

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Table 12: Estimated marginal effects and robust standard errors of the non recursive
multivariate probit model with endogenous consumption.
IF II
FINLIT
Mid 0.1018∗∗∗ -0.0423∗∗
(0.0081) (0.0142)
High 0.1702∗∗∗ -0.0268
(0.0195) (0.0280)
ISLFINLIT
Mid 0.0174∗ 0.0123
(0.0074) (0.0122)
High 0.1116∗∗∗ -0.1782∗∗∗
(0.0159) (0.0223)
Feedback IF -II Yes
Correlated errors Yes
Endo. consumpt. Yes
Control variables Yes
Observations 10590
R2 0.1209
Log-likelihood 17796.59
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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